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EDIT'ORIAL 
Five yeats !after unification, the reconstruction of the 
economy i a:p.d labour market transformation in East 
German~ :have made significant progress. What re-
mains azie the efforts required to "come together", to 
grow acclistomed to new social conditions and the differ-
ingment~ties that continue to characterise day-to-day 
: life in Gel\lD.B.Ily. Despite the massive transfer of re-
1 sources Gepnan unity cannot simply be "produced". 
Labour matket policy, confronted with the loss of more 
than three ~on jobs within a short space of time, has 
played ~ iplportant role in the East German transfor-
mation p~ess from the outset. The relevant institu-
tions were ¢apable of policy action at an early stage and 
the massl~~ deployment of labour market policy meas-
ures, in ~Y cases withEU support, prevented an even 
moredra:tn~ticriseinunemployment. Yetlabourmarket 
policy caimpt solve the employment problem on its own, 
butmust:-thlsisanimportantlesson:fromEastGerman 
developments - join forces with other policy areas 
related to employment. A number of innovative ap-
proaches were developed in East Germany with the aim 
of establi~Jhing such forms of cooperation. These should 
! bedevelo~dfurtherandmayopen up new opportunities 
for empl<;yJr!ent policy in West Germany, too. 
: ! 
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To some extent at least, the lessons learnt in East Germany 
are potentially relevant to the other transformation coun-
tries, even though the relatively favourable conditions in 
East Germany- the massive provision of transfer benefits 
and the assumption of tried and tested institutions- do not 
exist elsewhere in Eastern Europe. There are growing 
signs, particularly in the CIS countries, that the labour 
market problems there, long underestimated by experts, 
will prove very difficult to solve. 
With this double edition the "Employment Observatory 
East Germany" takes its leave of its readers. Since the start 
of1992 we have attempted through this publication to shed 
light on the multi-dimensional aspects of the transforma-
tion process on the East German labour market and to 
bring them to the attention of a wider audience, both within 
Germany and abroad. The editors and the editorial advi-
sory council would like to thank the authors from the 
Science Centre Berlin (WZB) and the other research insti-
tutions for their contributions and the Directorate-General 
V of the European Commission for its financial support for 
this project. 
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ECONOMIC AND LABOUR MARKET STATISTICS 
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 
half~ half~ half· half· b.8Jf.· half~ half. half- half. 
year year year year year year year year. year 
1989 1989. 1990 1990. 1991 1991. 1992 1992 1993 
Economy . · , . 
1. Gross Domestic Product in 1991 prices (billions ofDM) 150.1 153.5 147.0 107.4 .98.1 107.9. 104.9 117.2 114.1 
2. Gross value added by sector in 1991 prices 
(billions ofDM) 
0.6 2.1 Agriculture and forestry 3.8 7.8 3.0 7.4 ··o.1 7.1 6.1 1.3 
2.2 Energy and mining 10.1 10.4 9.9 8.9 8.7 7.3 6.9 6.6 6.6 
2.3 Manufacturing 48.8 46.5 44.5 21.1 16.4 18.5 17.3 19.7 19.1 
2.4 Construction ·13.6· 13.2 13.2 12.9 11.8 12.5 15.6 16.3 16.8 
2.5 Trade arid transport 28.3 29.2 28.2 17.9 14.3 14.9 14.8 16.3 16.2 
2.6 Services 16.0 16.4 16.6 14.0 22.2 28.5 26.0 27.3 27.1 
2.7 Government 23.6 24.0 25.4 22.4 23.6 22.6 22.5 22.5 24.8 
3. Expenditure on the Gross National Product 
in 1991 prices (billions ofDM) . · 
84.7 95.0' 3.1 Private consumption ... ",, 82.1 -89.4. 82.5 91.6 92.9 104.0 96.0 
3.2 Government consumption .. 41.4 43.4 43.6 43.4 39.1 48.6 43.7 50.0' 43.5 
3.3 Fixed capital formation 28.6 28.7 28.7 36.6 42.1 50.0 56.0 61.7 62.7 
3.4 Exports niinus imports -4.2 -4.5 -3.8' -49.3 -65.9 -78.4 -88.0 -91.9 -90.5 
Labour market 
4. Working~age population (in thousands) 10721 10618 10527 10465 
4.1 Migrations to West ~rmany (in thou$mds) 49 339 257 138 102 148 94 106 78 
4.2 Migrations from West Germany (in thousands) 1. 4 12 24 34 47 51 61 54 
4.3 Commuters to West Germany(in thousands) · 206 446 541 451 506 
5 •. Total employment (in thousands) 9836 9610 9076 8060 7462 6903 6423 6298 6183 
5.1 Shareoffemaleeml!oyment(%) .. . 49 49 47 46 46 46 46 45 
5.2 Employees in Treu nd companies (in thousands) - 4100 2979 2115 1404 1070 458 296 
6. EmplOyment by sector (in thousands) · 
9'71 291 234 6.1 Agriculture and forestry 977 804 .()51 469 385 255 
6.2 Energy and mining 349 351 .345 320 244 208 181 164 146 
6.3 Manufacturing 3509 3254 3092 2658 2171 1727 1336 .. 1210 1120 
6.4 Construction 629 622 620 640 702 728 792 840 883 
6.5 Trade and transport 1500 1535 1446 1288 1251 1205 1149 1133 1116 
6.6 Services . 617 622 649 771 919 969 999 1039 1075 
6;7 Government(incl.ABMs) ·2040 2040 1965 1672 1505 1452 1436 1412 1360 
7. Emplo~ent in labour market measures (in thousands) 
20 148 390 402 355. 237 7.1 Employed in job creation measures. (ABMs) , .· 
7.2 "W~st subsidies East"(§ 249h AFG) 
1794 
14 
7.3 Short-time workers . 656 1899 1035 417 233 201 
7.4 Full-time equivalent ofloss of working hours · 
in case of short-time working 
8. Non-active population in labour market measures 
866 1078 594 223 109 89 
(in thousands) 
8.1 In full~time further training measures 45 170 310 442 434 368 
8.2 In early retirement 460 521 705 806 834 857 
9. Total persons in labour market measures 
(7.1 + 7.2 + 7.4 +8.t + 8.2) (in thousands) 1391 1917 .. 1999. 1873 1732 1565 
9.1 As %ofpotentiallabourforce (11.) 15 22 23 21 20 18 
10. Total unemployment (in tho:usands) 142 642 843 1038 . 1123 1101 hoo 
10.1 Unemployed women (in thousands) 69 352 482 635 715 704 708 
10.2 Unemployed women(%) . · 54.6 55.2 59 .. 5 61.6 63.6 63.9. 64.4. 
10.3. Long-term unemployed (in thousands) 271 
10.4 Long-term unemployed (as% of unemployed) · 24,4 
10.5 Women pr9portion of the long-term unemployed(%) 68.9 
10.6 Unemployment rate (Tsd.) 1.6 7.3 9.5 11.8 14.2 13.9 15.1 
10.7 Male unemployment rate(%) 6.4 8.0 8.9 10.0 •.. 9.7 ··10.4 
10.8 Female Unemployment rate(%) 8.2 11.2 14.7 18.9 18.6 20.2 
11. Labour force potential (4.3+5.+8.1+8.2+10} (in thousands) 9836 9610 I 9413 9442 9497 9245 9173 
11.1 As% of working-age population (4.) 92 89 90 88 
12. Labour force (4.3+5.+10.) (in thousands) . 9836 9610 ' 8908 8751 8482 7997 7905 
12,1 Activity rate (12. as% of 4.) 92 84 .81 76 
'13. Shortfall of "regular" emplOyment (9.+10.) (in thousands) 2033 2760 3037 .2996 2833 ·2665 
13.1 As% of potential labour force (11.) · 22. 29 32 32 31 29 
Comments: 
In general, stock data in the table correspond with figures drawn up at the end of the given half-year periods (except: rows 4., 4.3, 5.1: data 
for May or November; rows 5., 6.1-6. 7: averages of the 2nd and 4th quarters respectively; row 5.2: 1990/911 July or 1 January after the end 
of the half-years; rows 7.3, 7.4: for first half-year 1990 figure from mid-July; rows 10.3-10.6: end of September). 
Rows 5., 6.1-6. 7: total employment excl. commuters to West Germany, but including employment in labour market measures (rows 7.1-7 .3); 
row 7.4: number of short-time workers multiplied by the average amount of working time lost; row 8.1: until mid-1992 estimated; row 11: excl. 
"discouraged workers" outside labour market policy measures; rows 10.3-10.5: persons registered unemployed for 1 year or longer; rows 10.6-
10.8: from 1995 onwards the basis of the unemployment rate has been changed (dependent civilian working population in June 1994; earlier 
basis dated from the end of 1989, then from November 1990, then from June 1992 and then from June 1993). 
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1. :~ -•. ~72 ·~ · · 72 . .'. 1cf · .,~ : ·'16~~ 'Sa ~\:'·9or~ ~~~· 
2. 
National aceo1,1!nts of the Federal Statistics Office and the German Economic Research Institute(DIW), March-October 1995 (rows 1.-3.4, 
5., 6.-6. 7); Offil:iaJ Reports and Press Releases of the Federal Employment Service (rows 7.1-7.3, 8.2, 10.-10.8); Institute for Employment 
Research(!AQ), IAB-Kurzberichte and .lAB-Werkstattberichte(rows 4., 4.1, 4.2, 7.4, 8.1); Infratest Social Research, labour market monitor 
for the new f~ral states, Munich/Nuremberg 1991-95 (rows 4., 4.3, 5.1); monthly information sheet of the Treuhandanstalt (row 5.2); 
calculations by the editors. 
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Labour Market Policy in East Germany: 
An Evaluation Five Years after Unification 
Over the past five years labour market policy in East Germany has been 
confronted with a dramatic decline in employment totalling more than 
three million jobs. Despite the success - about which there can be no 
doubt- in having prevented a further rise in mass unemployment, the 
limits to labour market policy have become increasingly apparent. The 
one central lesson must surely be that labour market policy alone is 
unable to solve the employment problems facing the new Lander and 
that the links with other policy areas of relevance to employment must 
be strengthened, in both instrumental and institutional terms. Some 
innovative approaches have been developed for new cooperation mod-
els in East Germany, yet after just five years there is the real danger that 
they will become buried under the weight of financial constraints and 
the particularist forms of thinking predominant at the administrative 
and political levels. 
tween 6 and 9%, largely due to growth 
in the construction and service sec-
tors. The decline in the number of 
working hours and employment was 
not arrested until the start of 1994, 
however. 
In 1994 there were 6.3 million peo-
ple in employment in East Germany, 
just two thirds of the original labour 
force. Although rapid economic 
growth is expected to continue, both 
short and long-term labour market 
projections suggest that employment 
is recovering only very slowly. This 
reflects the still serious - although 
narrowing- productivity gap vis a vis 
West Germany and the rapid rise in 
wages, which have surged far ahead of 
productivity growth (Table 1). 
Following a sharp rise to mid-1991, 
registered unemployment in East 
Germany has fluctuated between 
around 1 and 1.2 million, with a slight 
decline observed of late. Yet regis-
tered unemployment has accounted 
for a relatively small share of overall 
underemployment in the new Lander. 
Figure 1: Labour Market Trends in East Germany, 1989 to 1994 
The opening of the GDR economy to 
world markets revealed the obsoles-
cence of its internal division oflabour 
and of the international division of 
labour within the Council for Mutual 
Economic Cooperation (CMEA). The 
sudden exposure to competition sub-
jected the previously largely autar-
chic economy of the GDR to a shock. 
This initial shock was exacerbated in 
mid-1990 by the appreciation of the 
GDR-Mark by the order of 300% to 
400% as a result of monetary union 
with the Federal Republic. 
Millions 
10 .. 
Potential East German Labour Force 
The capital stock was antiquated. 
Productivity per working hour was 
around one third of that in West Ger-
many (Table 1). The public adminis-
tration - an important factor for eco-
nomic prosperity - was unsuited to 
the new system of highly differenti-
ated statutory regulations that was 
gradually extended, with slight modi-
fications, to the territory of the former 
GDR in the wake of political union 
(October 1990). 
The result was a massive contrac-
tion of output, particularly in indus-
try and agriculture, a trend exacer-
bated by the collapse of markets in 
Eastern Europe. Initially as a conse-
quence of inadequate innovation and 
investment, but also of the privatisa-
tion policy pursued by the Treuhand-
anstalt, the early years of the trans-
formation were characterised by a far-
reaching deindustrialisation process 
in eastern Germany. This has now 
given way to a slow reindustrialisa-
tion. 
Within the space of two years GDP 
fell to two thirds of its starting level in 
1989. Since 1992, however, it has been 
increasing at an annual rate of be-
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 .... 
* ABM plus §249h AFG. 
} 
Full-time further training; 
other forms of non-participation 
------ Labour force 
Registered 
unemployed 
•• Loss of working hours converted into full-time equivalents. 
Source: lAB. 
4~----~----~----.-----,-----,-----,---~ 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
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In spite of the drastic decline in 
employment it proved possible to 
prevent an even more substantial 
rise in unemployment. This reflects 
the extent to which the burden on 
the East German labour market 
has been eased: by outward migra-
tion and "commuting" to work in 
West Germany (cf. East Germany, 
No.14,pp. 7-ll)andbylabourmar-
ket policy measures such as short-
time working, early retirement, 
vocational training measures (fur-
ther training, retraining), job crea-
tion measures (ABM) and, since 
1993, wage cost subsidies under § 
249h of the Labour Promotion Act 
(LP A). These measures are listed in 
figure!. 
At the end of 1991 the measures 
implemented served to ease the 
burden on the East German labour 
market to the tune of almost two 
million persons, whereas regis-
tered unemployment was "just" one 
million. When the special provi-
sions on short-time working and 
early retirement came to an end, 
legal changes were introduced and 
budgetary restrictions imposed, 
this policy effect declined by almost 
half to 1.2 million persons (at the 
end of 1994). The figure is expected 
to sink further. 
In the light of these develop-
ments, it is inevitable that invest-
ment to modernise the capital stock 
and infrastructure has played a key 
role in solving the labour market 
problems facing the new federal 
states. Indeed, a - virtually innu-
merable - variety of economic sup-
port programmes have been intro-
duced to bolster investment: invest-
ment grants, low-interest loan pro-
grammes, loan guarantees, tax al-
lowances, grants for research and 
development in small and medium-
sized enterprises, etc. In many 
cases these forms of assistance can 
be claimed in cumulative fashion. 
There is little firm evidence regard-
ing their impact on job creation and 
maintenance, however. Between 
1990 and 1993 a total of DM 178 
billion were granted in direct sup-
port of commercial and infrastruc-
tural investment. Survey evidence 
suggests that without these funds 
37% of firms would have invested 
nothing at all and 33% would have 
invested less. The impact of such 
investment is, however, subject to 
time lags and is clearly still not 
sufficient to close the employment 
gap over the medium term, al-
though in per capita terms invest-
ment in the new Lander has been 
East Germany no. 16117 - November 1995 
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higher than in West Germany since 
1993. 
The functions of labour market 
policy 
In such a situation labour market 
policy has an indispensable comple-
mentary role to play. More so than in 
West Germany, it can help push for-
ward structural change and support 
the creation of new, permanent jobs; it 
cannot create such jobs by itself, how-
ever. In doing so it must take account 
of the specific characteristics of the 
shock transition to a market economy 
with all its problematic repercus-
sions: it is not a temporary decline in 
employment that must be countered, 
but long-term, persistent mass unem-
ployment; a trend towards a polarisa-
tion between structurally weak and 
favoured regions has begun (cf. 
Trends in this issue); and, last but not 
least, there are signs of increasingly 
pronounced segmentation and rising 
long-term unemployment. 
The matrix reproduced on the fol-
lowing page can be used to systemise 
the central functions oflabour market 
policy, whereby individual instru-
ments may perform several functions. 
An additional important function 
has crystallised in ad hoc fashion out 
of the transformation process under 
way in the new Lander, namely as a 
"labour market fire brigade". This is 
reflected in the implementation of 
preliminary measures with a rapid 
impact in terms of easing labour mar-
ket pressure, but which do not at-
tempt to tackle the employment prob-
lem itself. The short-time working al-
lowance, in particular, the "measure 
of the first hour", fulfilled such a "fire 
brigade" function: preventing a rapid 
rise in registered unemployment in 
the face of the rapidity with which 
labour was being shed and the slow-
ness with which new jobs were being 
created. The underlying aim was to 
gain time for more productive solu-
tions (cf. East Germany, No. 1, p. 6). 
Almost all the measures in the "tool 
box" of the Federal Labour Office have 
performed the function, vital in the 
context of transition, of easing the 
pressure on the labour market. This 
was particularly the case with the 
short-time working allowance and 
early retirement; both measures 
merely offer wage compensation with-
out any skill maintaining or improv-
ing effect, although short-time work 
does at least has a stabilising effect on 
employment. Job creation and train-
ing measures also served to reduce 
labour market pressure, but only af-
ter an initial start-up phase. The im-
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Level 
Individual Macro/ 
labour market 
Dura- Current unemploy- Social security Avoiding unemploy-
tion ment-reducing effect through wage ment, easing 
compensation pressure on labour 
market 
Improving prospects Bridging function: Bridging function: 
for the future improving individual developing new 
employment chances employment fields 
plementation of such measures is, 
namely, conditional on the availabil-
ity of a network of policy providers and 
deliverers, which was developed only 
gradually. Despite the far smaller size 
of the working population, the peak 
number of participants injob creation 
and training measures - around 
400,000 and 500,000 respectively -
was far higher than the corresponding 
figures in West Germany (in 1992, for 
instance, around 80,000 on job crea-
tion schemes and 250,000 in full-time 
vocational training measures: cf. East 
Germany, No. 2, pp. 6-7). 
After the initial start-up phase, job 
creation and further training and re-
training measures performed a sig-
nificant "bridging function" between 
the secondary and the regular labour 
market. Their task was to open up 
new occupational perspectives for the 
future, at both the individual and la-
bour market levels. Expenditure on 
such "future-oriented" active labour 
market policy measures (including, 
for instance, subsidies for training on 
the job, mobility assistance and sup-
port for those embarking on self-em-
ployment) achieved a volume of al-
most DM 20 billion a year in 1992 and 
1993 and has since been maintained 
at a scarcely reduced financial vol-
ume. In 1995 such measures are to 
account for almost half, namely 45%, 
of spending by the Federal Labour 
Office in East Germany; this, in tum, 
amounts to as much as 38% of total 
labour market policy expenditure at 
central government level. 
Subordinate to active labour mar-
ket policy measures, wage compensa-
tion benefits for the unemployed -
unemployment benefit (an insurance 
benefit) and the means-tested unem-
ployment assistance provided by cen-
tral government- have played an im-
portant role in providing social secu-
rity for the individual and so helping 
to stabilise purchasing power at the 
macro level (for details of financial 
expenditure cf. Table 2). 
As the employment crisis has be-
come more prolonged it has become 
increasingly apparent that labour 
market policy alone is unable to close 
the employment gap. In addition to 
the traditional "accompanying" role of 
labour market policy, an increasingly 
important aim has been to provide 
direct support for the economic recov-
ery using funds earmarked for labour 
promotion. For example, job creation 
measures were implemented to clean 
up production sites and commercial 
buildings and thus to help overcome 
obstacles to investment. The so-called 
"mega job creation projects" signalled 
something of a reorientation away 
from traditional support for the indi-
vidual, as foreseen under the LPA, in 
favour of support for projects. Increas-
ingly an attempt has been made to 
seek new forms of training directly 
related to economic needs by coordi-
nating further training and job crea-
tion strategies. 
The most obvious expression of this 
development is the introduction of the 
so-called "wage cost subsidy, East" 
under § 249 h of the LPA, a measure 
due to run until 1997. Under this 
scheme the principle of financing 
work rather than unemployment is 
pursued at the instrumental level: 
unemployment support benefits are 
channelled directly into employment-
promoting activities. The wage cost 
subsidy is equal to the average level of 
unemployment benefit and unem-
ployment assistance and is available 
for work in environmental protection, 
social services and youth aid, (more 
recently also for work to improve 
sporting opportunities, free cultural 
work and to prepare for measures to 
restore historical monuments: cf. 
East Germany, No.10, pp. 8-10). Such 
measures require cofinancing by state 
or local government, provider organi-
sations or other institutions (e.g. the 
Treuhandanstalt) benefiting from the 
structural improvements realised un-
der the measure. Around 110,000 peo-
ple are employed in such projects, 
largely in cleaning up the environ-
ment. 
In order to address the wide variety 
of policy tasks and to ensure the effi-
cient implementation of labour mar-
East Germany no. 16/17 - November 1995 
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ket instruments it was necessary to 
establish a "labour market policy in-
frastructure" more or less out of noth-
ing. Employment offices were estab-
lished within a short space of time. In 
addition to the traditional deliverers 
of labour market policy measures (in 
particular educational establish-
ments), in many cases "imported" 
from West Germany, so-called "labour 
promotion, employment and struc-
tural development" companies (ABS 
companies: cf. East Germany, No. 8, 
pp. 3-6) were set up as an innovative 
new component. The specific aim of 
such companies was to establish a 
"bridge" between labour market 
policy and structural development, 
for example by allowing projects in 
receipt of support to set up as private 
firms. By the end of 1994 a finely 
meshed net of almost 400 companies 
had been established, providing sup-
port for around 160,000 individuals 
(105,000 on job creation schemes, 
42,000 in receipt of wage cost subsi-
dies under§ 249 h of the LPA, 3,000 
undergoing training and 4,000 on 
short-time working). 
How successful have labour 
market policy measures been? 
Given the persistent lack of research 
findings, conclusions regarding the 
"success" of the labour market policy 
measures deployed are subject to 
more or less serious reservations. A 
number of significant indicators are 
available, however. 
The use of simplified, special regu-
lations for the new federal states fa-
cilitated the implementation oflabour 
market policy instruments on a mas-
sive scale. Between November 1989 
and November 1994 more than half 
(57%) of the East German working 
population participated, in some 
cases repeatedly, in labour market 
policy measures. If training measures 
conducted within firms and not in 
receipt of public support are added to 
this figure, as many as 81% partici-
pated in such adjustment measures. 
Many take the view that German cen-
tral, state and local government failed 
to implement structural policies early 
enough and in the dimensions re-
quired to match the massive imple-
mentation oflabour market policy. In 
this context the debates on the priva-
tisation and restructuring of firms 
owned by the Treuhandanstalt and on 
the maintenance of "industrial cores" 
(cf. East Germany, No. 11) should be 
recalled. 
Given the order of magnitude of 
policy deployment it is hardly surpris-
ing that, particularly in the initial 
_j 
phase, labour market policy was not 
focused on specific target groups to 
any significant degree. Changes in the 
structure of participants do indicate, 
however, that the measures are now 
being implemented in more selective 
fashion, the aim being to counter the 
increasing entrenchment of unem-
ployment among disadvantaged 
groups, in particular women and the 
elderly. 
An important indicator for the suc-
cess oflabour market policy measures 
is whether participants remain in 
employment or find a job after the end 
of the measure. As many as 59% of 
those supported by means of a job 
creation scheme subsequently found 
work: 17% with the institution provid-
ing the measure, 40% in another en-
terprise, 2% in self-employment. Most 
of them look for a "regular" job during 
their period of ABM activity, and 
many leave measures early because 
they have found alternative employ-
ment. 
More than a quarter of former par-
ticipants remain unemployed after 
completing anABM programme. This 
clearly reveals the limitations to such 
a "bridging strategy", when, on com-
pletion of a measure, the same em-
ployment shortfall still exists. 
The last remark applies particu-
larly to training measures. The pro-
portion of former participants re-
maining unemployed after a training 
scheme-45%- is significantly higher 
than in the case of ABM. Even so, 44% 
of all participants and 52% of those in 
employment following participation 
report a positive change in their occu-
pational situation by virtue of the 
training provided: either in terms of 
getting a new job, an improvement in 
occupational terms or increased job 
security. 
Selected problem areas 
Based on the experiences of recent 
years a number of aspects appear to be 
of special relevance in terms of the on-
going development of labour market 
policy both in Germany and in the 
transformation countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
"Training in the dark": at best a 
difficult task 
The difficulty of matching publicly 
supported vocational training meas-
ures to (regional) training needs has 
been a persistent problem in western 
industrialised countries; in East Ger-
many the fact that the entire economy 
was undergoing transition exacer-
FOCUS 
bated this problem enormously. On 
the one hand there was the danger 
that the training strategies - indis-
pensable as they were in view of the 
fundamental process of economic re-
structuring - could run up against a 
"brick wall" because the required em-
ployment opportunities simply were 
not available. Job creation measures 
(including support for those entering 
self-employment) are more important 
than training in such a situation. On 
the other hand, the relevance of "re-
maining in employment" as an indica-
tor of success must be called into ques-
tion in this context: training as an 
alternative to long-term unemploy-
ment can - at the individual level -
help to counter deskilling and desta-
bilisation processes and thus improve 
the chances of employment at a later 
date. What is important at the re-
gionallevel is to maintain and develop 
labour force skill potential as an im-
portant factor for regional competi-
tiveness and as a motor for future 
development. Even so, the difficulties 
encountered in orienting vocational 
training to regional training needs 
are all too apparent: they are the more 
intractable, the greater the uncer-
tainty surrounding the prospects for 
regional development. 
Table 2: Expenditure by the Federal Labour Office (FLO) in the New Federal States (million DM) 
Type of Measure 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 H* 
I. Future-oriented active labour market policy measures 7,863.9 19,221.6 19,505.1 15,423.1 17,203.0 
Standard job creation measures (ABM) 3,075.3 7,783.6 8,585.6 6,811.5 7,294.0 
Wage cost subsidy under § 249 h LPA - - 313.9 1,325.3 1,720.1 
Further training and retraining 4,267.3 10,717.0 10,306.5 6,989.1 7,194.3 
Work familiarisation allowance 520.4 695.4 201.6 160.7 393.6 
Other (ABM for the elderly, support for the hard-to-place, ESF) 0.9 25.6 97.5 136.5 601.0 
As a % oftotal 26.3% 41.8% 38.5% 37.0% 44.9% 
II. Employment-stabilising measures 
Short-time working allowance 10,005.9 2,652.5 918.8 498.7 447.9 
As a% oftotal 33.5% 5.8% 1.8% 1.2% 1.2% 
Ill. Measures to prepare individuals for the labour market 494.1 1,112.4 1,559.5 1,485.0 2,155.0 
Training 352.0 676.7 923.6 865.3 1,007.9 
Occupational rehabilitation 100.9 324.8 526.8 602.0 1,147.1 
Integration of ethnic German immigrants 41.2 110.9 109.1 17.7 0.0 
As a % of total 1.7% 2.4% 3.1% 3.6% 5.6% 
N. Wage compensation benefits 10,558.2 21,362.6 26.596.2 22,099.7 15,339.5 
Early retirement/transitory allowance for the elderly 2,680.3 9,329.8 13,459.5 9,033.0 2,452.5 
Unemployment benefit 7,810.0 11,809.2 12,868.3 12,662.8 12,507.0 
Allowance for workers whose employer is bankrupt 67.9 223.6 268.4 403.9 380.0 
As a % of total 35.4% 46.4% 52.5% 53.1% 40.1% 
v. Other 932.9 1,683.1 2,035.4 2,140.4 3,138.9 
Miscellaneous (incl. bad weather allowance) 74.1 357.0 452.4 456.4 615.8 
Special tasks of the FLO, administration 858.8 1,326.1 1,583.0 1,684.0 2,523.1 
As a % of total 3.1% 3.7% 4.0% 5.1% 8.2% 
Total 29,855.0 46,032.2 50,615.0 41,647.0 38,284.3 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
memo item: Unemployment assistance (federal budget) 271.3 1,488.5 3,657.8 5,056.9 7,576.0 
* According to budget proposal 
Source: Federal Labour Office; lAB. 
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Necessity is the mother of inven-
tion. In order to overcome such diffi-
culties a number innovative coordina-
tion structures have been established 
in East Germany, such as the regional 
"Reconstruction Groups" (Aufbaustii-
be) and the "Regional Qualification 
Development Centres" (RQZs, joined 
together in a supra-regional network, 
a working party on "Qualification De-
velopment Management - QUEM). 
Particularly in the initial phase, the 
reconstruction groups were set up 
within the public administration with 
the task of coordinating support for 
investment and the labour market. 
The RQZs, scientific service institu-
tions financed by the Ministry ofEdu-
cation, were entrusted with the task 
of analysing qualification develop-
ment at regional level and to advise 
local training providers and enter-
prises. These bodies were set up for a 
limited period only, however, and 
managed to exert only a very limited 
influence on developments in this 
area. 
Job creation schemes: a balancing 
act on the path to competitive jobs 
In view of the huge employment short-
fall in the wake of economic transfor-
mation, employment promotion in the 
form of wage subsidies inevitably 
played an important role. Such job 
creation measures can, at the same 
time, also be used to improve supply-
side structures, for example by devel-
oping the regional infrastructure or 
cleaning up the environment. They 
are largely "self-financing": at least 60 
to 70% of the costs are recouped in the 
form oflower wage compensation ben-
efit payments and additional revenue 
from taxes and social insurance con-
tributions. 
In order to be effective, however, 
such measures must be "additional" 
in nature, i.e. must not compete with 
private sector economic activities 
and must be such that they would not 
have been performed in the absence 
of the support. This automatically 
poses controversial questions as to 
the "appropriate" pay level, i.e. one 
that does not hinder participants 
from moving to the regular labour 
market, and the maximum accept-
able order of magnitude for the meas-
ures as a whole. Another issue is the 
alternative uses to which these funds 
could be put, e.g. for central, state 
and local government programmes to 
improve infrastructure and so ben-
efit firms. 
In the case of East Germany the 
theoretical reservations relating to 
concern about distorting the market 
order were allayed by the fact that job 
creation measures there have to be 
approved by the leading regional ac-
tors, in particular business repre-
sentatives such as the craft chambers. 
On the other hand, financial con-
straints and specific regulations, for 
example on additionality and the level 
of individual support, and the short-
term orientation of funding led at 
times to steering problems (stop-and-
go policy). 
Traditional job creation measures 
are a tried and tested instrument for 
promoting target groups and coping 
with transitory emplo:Yment short-
falls. They were unable to cope with 
the additional structural-policy func-
tions in the context of the transforma-
tion process, however, not least due to 
the fact that they are financed solely 
out of contributions to the unemploy-
ment insurance fund. It was thus logi-
cal that a new instrument, wage cost 
subsidies under § 249 h of the LPA, 
were introduced, which established a 
much firmer link between the LPA 
instruments and structural and eco-
nomic policy. Publicly supported em-
ployment under the wage cost subsidy 
provisions is increasingly oriented to 
the regular "primary" labour market. 
However, this is contingent on coop-
eration between a variety of political 
spheres (e.g. with the environmental 
and economic policy departments) 
and different tiers of government 
(central, state and local levels), coop-
eration which has proved difficult at 
times. 
Short-time working as a launching 
pad 
While short-time working can stabi-
lise employment, even for extended 
periods, and thus initially avoid the 
negative consequences of redun-
dancy, it cannot by itself solve the 
employment problem. Even though, 
in the context of the transformation 
process, it was frequently not possible 
to maintain employment with the 
original employer- as is the case with 
the traditional, "cyclical" short-time 
working - this instrument has in 
many cases cushioned the transfer to 
a new job. Twelve months after short-
time working just under half of the 
participants were in full-time employ-
ment; indeed, the most recent figures 
(November 1994) show that 75% ofthe 
short-time workers inN ovember 1993 
were in employment a year later. Be-
tween 10 and 15% were unemployed 
after the twelve-month period. For 
some, short-time working eased the 
transition out of the labour force, e.g. 
into early retirement. 
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The- seemingly obvious- attempt 
to link short-time working with train-
ing measures, and thus to improve 
individual labour market chances, 
proved only moderately successful. 
Despite the additional incentives cre-
ated by collectively agreed provisions, 
only 7% of those on short-time work-
ing were participating in training 
schemes at the end of 1991. It was 
thus inevitable that, as job creation 
and training measures increased in 
importance, short time working, 
which was essentially merely a form 
of wage compensation rather than an 
active measure, was cut back. 
Reducing labour supply through 
early retirement: an expensive 
emergency solution 
Almost one million people took advan-
tage of the special provisions on early 
retirement in force until the end of 
1992. In the years 1992 to 1994 an 
annual average of more than DM 10 
billion were required to finance these 
measures. Since then the cost of the 
programmes has fallen, reflecting the 
fact that those on early retirement are 
steadily reaching the age limit for 
pension entitlement (standard retire-
ment age or the lower age limit 
granted for labour market reasons: cf. 
East Germany, No. 5, pp. 5-6). 
Early retirement fails to build la-
bour market bridges for the future. 
This is true not only at the individual 
level (a return to employment is only 
possible in exceptional cases), but also 
at the macro level (the use of re-
sources is purely consumptive in na-
ture and makes no direct contribution 
to creating new jobs). In the final 
analysis it is more "productive" means 
of reducing the burden on the labour 
market that should be sought. It is 
against this background that the spe-
cial early retirement provisions were 
not extended, and the introduction of 
similar options, even restricted to re-
gions with a particularly serious em-
ployment shortfall or structural prob-
lems, is unlikely. 
Developing a labour market policy 
infrastructure as a precondition for 
success 
A necessary condition for the success-
ful implementation of policy meas-
ures is an adequate labour market 
policy infrastructure. 
The "Labour and Wages Offices" of 
the former GDR, with around 3,600 
employees, performed only very lim-
ited functions with respect to match-
ing labour supply and demand. Their 
activities focused on cooperation with 
large enterprises, which were fre-
quently obliged to employ "problem 
cases". Neither quantitatively nor 
qualitatively were they prepared for 
the new tasks they were to face. Be-
sides establishing a network of local 
and state employment offices (since 
1992 employing around 25,000 staff) 
it was necessary to install an effective 
network of service providers, to create 
advisory institutions and develop or-
ganisational forms of cooperation and 
coordination. 
In many areas the reconstruction 
phase was dogged by inevitable fric-
tions, a good example being the dubi-
ous training measures offered by 
some commercial training establish-
ments. At the same time, the initial 
"openness" created space for a num-
ber of infrastructural innovations, al-
though now, in the consolidation 
phase, many of these are being 
scrapped. The financial support for 
advisory institutions such as the 
RQZs, for instance, is due to expire, 
and these institutions are also suffer-
ing from the fact that the employment 
offices are placing far fewer ABM re-
sources at their disposal than in the 
initial phase. Also apparent is a func-
tional shift on the part of ABS compa-
nies towards traditional providers on 
a "secondary labour market", whore-
ceive long-term labour market policy 
subsidies to provide measures for the 
hard-to-place. The hopes once held by 
both politicians and academics that 
ABS companies could play a key role 
in coordinating between structural 
and labour market policy have been 
largely - although not everywhere -
disappointed. In many cases the insti-
tutional basis for a bridging function 
across political boundaries has been 
removed before it had even begun to 
make its effects felt. 
Labour market policy as a 
necessary complementary 
strategy 
The specific political and economic 
characteristics of the transformation 
in East Germany led to a transfer of 
public resources from West to East 
Germany unparalleled in any trans-
formation country in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In 1995 the net 
transfers will total DM 150 billion, 
around 5% ofWest German GDP and 
as much as 40% of East German GDP. 
This support for purchasing power 
and investment was initially widely 
held by economists and politicians to 
be necessary, but it clearly cannot be 
increased at will and is increasingly 
being called into question. 
Between 1991 and 1995 the Federal 
Labour Office spent around DM 205 
billion in East Germany. Of this 
around DM 55 billion were financed 
by East German contributions to the 
unemployment insurance fund and 
around DM 60 billion by a central 
government grant financed out of gen-
eral tax revenue; around DM 90 bil-
lion took the form of a transfer ofWest 
German contributions to the unem-
ployment insurance fund. The financ-
ing of such costs incurred as a result of 
unification out of social insurance 
contributions has been heavily criti-
cised, not least due to the associated 
rise in indirect labour costs: the con-
tribution rate to the unemployment 
insurance fund was raised from 4.3% 
to 6.8%, subsequently reduced to 6.3% 
only to rise again to 6.5% (cf. East 
Germany, No. 3-4, p. 12, No. 10/94, 
pp. 4-5). 
Precisely because, at the institu-
tional level, labour market policy was 
the first policy area capable of policy 
action in East Germany, it has suf-
fered from greater pressure to act 
than other policy areas (e.g. struc-
tural and economic policy) and has 
faced unjustifiable expectations with 
regard to its ability to solve the em-
ployment crisis. At the same time, it is 
important to be conscious of all that 
labour market policy has achieved 
and of its varied functions within the 
transformation process. 
Other Central and East European 
transformation countries have also 
suffered declining output compared 
with 1989, in some cases less severe 
than in East Germany (e.g. in Poland 
and Slovenia a decline of around 20% 
to 1991 and 1992 respectively, fol-
lowed by a sharp rise), in others far 
more severe (a fall of around one half 
in a number of Slavic CIS countries, 
where, moreover, there have so far 
been few signs of recovery: cf. Essay II 
in this issue). In view of the institu-
tional and political differences be-
tween East Germany and the other 
transformation countries and par-
ticularly the far lower level of finan-
cial resources available in the latter, a 
simplistic transfer to Eastern Europe 
of the labour market policies prac-
tised in East Germany during the first 
five years of the transformation is 
inconceivable. Yet this does not pre-
clude the possibility that the experi-
ences gained in East Germany might 
shed some light on the scope for and 
the limitations on labour market 
policy in the transformation process. 
Many of the problems described above 
can be generalised to other countries. 
For labour market policy in East 
Germany, the period of simplified 
"special provisions" with as broad a 
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field of application as possible have 
come to an end. What has remained is 
the gravity of the problems and the 
necessity of making an active contri-
bution to solving the employment 
problem- in East and West Germany 
-rather than merely financing under-
employment. The experiences so far 
have shown just how important it is to 
integrate labour market policy more 
closely with other policy areas of rel-
evance to employment. East Germany 
has generated a number of innovative 
new approaches in this regard in both 
instrumental and institutional terms. 
However, in view of the increasingly 
tight financial constraints and the 
"particularist" way of thinking, a 
fixation with departmental bounda-
ries, in political and administrative 
spheres, these approaches have in-
creasingly been in danger ofbecoming 
buried. In this light it is all the more 
important to develop these ap-
proaches further and to ensure their 
practical testing and implementation, 
for instance via on-going pilot 
projects, while ensuring cooperation 
between all the policy areas bearing 
responsibility for employment. 
Christian Brinkmann 
The author is head researcher at the Institut 
fiir Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (lAB) 
at the Federal Labour Office. 
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ESSAY I 
The German Transformation: 
A Modernisation Process at Two Different Speeds in East and West 
I. The "Wende" 
Processes of social change can be distinguished according 
to their depth, speed, direction and susceptibility to steer-
ing. We use the term "revolution" if the change is radical, 
affects the whole of society and is very rapid; the direction 
is determined to the extent that the ancien regime is to be 
destroyed. The further course of events, however, is unde-
termined and, in most historical cases, cannot be steered. 
The transformation processes in practically all the so-
cialist countries went through a revolutionary phase. In 
most cases the direction, too, was clear: from dictatorship 
to democracy, from the command to the market economy, 
from scarcity to affiuence. Since then, however, it has 
become evident that the social consensus on this direction 
has been called into question in a number of post-commu-
nist countries, or that other aims, in particular nationalist 
dominance or secession, have attained priority over the 
original goals of transformation. We have seen that "break-
downs of transformation" can occur, just as there'have 
always been "breakdowns of modernisation". 
One of the features specific to the transformation in East 
Germany was that, following its initial revolutionary 
phase, it appeared not only to have a clear direction, but 
also, it was believed, to be susceptible to steering: by means 
of the treaties on monetary and social union, the accession 
of the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
"import" of West German institutions in virtually every 
sphere oflife. The reconstruction ofWest Germany and the 
"economic miracle" after the Second World War would be 
repeated, only faster than in the years 1945 to 1965. It was 
widely believed that what had taken West Germany twenty 
years could be achieved in five. Yet sceptical voices were 
also raised early on: experts predicted that substantial 
tensions and delays would occur between "institution 
building" on the one hand and "the formationofthe political 
culture" on the other, just as occurred in West Germany 
after 1945. What is certainly now clear is that the problems 
of speed and susceptibility to steering were grossly under-
estimated. 
It is possible to characterise the transformation in Ger-
many in terms of the very different speeds in East and 
West: a succession of rapid changes in East Germany and 
a very slow reaction by West Germany to the new situation. 
One of the central reasons for the collapse of the GDR 
were the "blockages" that impeded social differentiation 
and individual welfare development, particularly during 
the 1980s. Living standards in the GDR- as measured by 
per capita GDP- were 50% of those in the Federal Republic 
in 1950; by 1970 this figure had fallen to 36%. The GDR 
survived the 1970s rather well, and closed the gap on West 
Germany slightly. The 1980s, however, were a decade of 
crisis-ridden stagnation, whereas the Federal Republic 
experienced a renewed economic upturn beginning in 1983. 
IT. Acceleration processes 
Stagnation in the GDR, a boom in the Federal Republic and 
an easing of travel restrictions for GDR citizens: this was 
the background to the wave of emigration that began in the 
summer of 1989. This, in tum, was decisive in rendering 
unification the most attractive option. Yet the collapse of 
the GDR was also the result of an unprecedented combina-
tion of"exit and voice", of mass exodus and mass protest. In 
this context the interesting hypothesis has been put for-
ward that the rising wave of demonstrations over a period 
of weeks - and the mass exodus - represented a self-
organising acceleration process, based not on leadership 
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but on "diffusion", namely the growing recognition that 
protest was possible without violence. It is well-known that 
the mass protests quickly subsided on the announcement of 
a date for free parliamentary elections at the start of 1990, 
while emigration stabilised at a low level. 
Two further acceleration processes followed: the demo-
graphic collapse and the collapse of the East German 
labour market. The decline in marriages, births and di-
vorces and the process of labour shedding reached their 
peak at approximately the same time in 1991, continued in 
1992 and have decelerated since 1993. It might seem 
obvious to suppose a simple causal relationship here, 
namely that the employment crisis initiated the demo-
graphic crises. Yet I prefer to take a more complex interre-
lationship as the point of departure. The decline in the 
number ofbirths amounted to 40% between 1990 and 1991, 
18% (1991/92), 9% (1992/93) and to2%in 1993/94; the birth 
rate is now just 48% of that in West Germany (where it has 
remained practically constant).The fall in the number of 
marriages amounted to as much as 50% from 1990 to 1991, 
easing rapidly to 5% between 1991 and 1992, and giving 
way to a slight increase of2% (1992193) and 7% (1993/94): 
the "marriage rate" is now 58% of the West German figure. 
(The decline in the divorce rate was even more drastic 
between 1990 and 1991, although the figure rose again 
sharply as early as 1992/93.) 
I have traced changes in marriage and birth rates back 
as far as 1910. Neither during the two world wars nor 
during economic crises did declines of even approximately 
the same order of magnitude occur. Can it be concluded 
from this that German unification marks the most funda-
mental upheaval - for the East German population - in 
recent German history? It is indeed possible to draw such 
a conclusion, although not in the sense of the greatest 
misery, but rather in the sense of the most profound 
individualisation process and systemic transition per unit 
of time, whereby the changes have brought with them not 
only stress and anxiety, but also previously unknown 
alternatives and options. In my view the demographic 
revolution in East Germany can be explained with respect 
to three components. The first is, indeed, the reaction to an 
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uncertain future in which - in areas of behaviour over 
which they exert some control - individuals seek to mini-
mise risks: marriage and childbirth can be determined by 
the individual, the labour market cannot. Secondly, there 
has been a reaction against the system of early marriages 
and births in the GDR (one cemented by state housing 
policy) and a move towards the western model in which 
they are postponed. Thirdly, there is the desire to exploit 
the new scope for travel and consumption, and also for 
partnership without marriage and children. It is widely 
forecast that some of the marriages, births and divorces 
that "have not occurred" have been merely postponed and 
will occur later. This is already clearly apparent in the case 
of divorces, to a lesser extent for marriages, although not 
yet for births. The stabilisation of demographic trends and 
the gap between East and West Germany in this regard will 
remain a sensitive indicator of German unification. 
The collapse of the GDR economy and of the East Ger-
man labour market have reached similarly dramatic pro-
portions. The decline in employment - from 9.8 million to 
the current figure of around 6.5 million persons- has been 
immense. Until the end of 1994 positive economic growth 
was restricted to the construction and private service 
sectors (cf. p. 2). In view of the order of magnitude ofthe 
employment losses- more than 3 million jobs- it is hardly 
surprising that scarcely any other development in Ger-
many has given rise to such alarm and political contro-
versy. 
It is indisputable that East German women have been 
particularly hard hit by the contraction of employment and 
that, despite this, they are not prepared to abandon the aim 
-largely achieved in the GDR- of being able to reconcile 
family responsibilities and paid employment. Micro-level 
analysis has shown that, parallel to the rapid loss of jobs 
and the sectoral shifts in employment, the two thirds of the 
working population still in employment enjoy an unex-
pected occupational and status stability. Studies by the 
Max-Planck Institute, Berlin, show that the overwhelming 
majority of those in continuous employment between 1989 
and 1993 remained in the same job, a comparable position 
or at least one with the same status. Although those in 
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managerial positions had to accept loss of status, few of 
them were made redundant. Moreover, in certain high-
status occupational groups (professional, private and pub-
lic services) women have fared just as well as men. Re-
searchers put this stability in the face of upheaval down to 
the importance of occupational qualifications in East Ger-
many, a phenomenon also encountered in West Germany 
and a unifying structural characteristic within Germany as 
a whole. 
III. Catching-up processes 
Alongside the demographic and labour market crises, 
growth and "catching-up" processes can also be observed, 
and they are occurring at comparable speed. They are 
particularly evident with respect to the welfare state, 
infrastructure and mass consumption. The rapid transfer 
of the institutions and benefits of the West German welfare 
state has been financed by massive transfers from West to 
East. Critics have warned, however, that these transfers 
have been financed to a great extent by public borrowing 
rather than by reduced consumption in West Germany. The 
transfers enabled not only the financial repercussions of 
mass redundancies to be cushioned in a socially acceptable 
way, but also the situation for East German pensioners to 
be improved swiftly and substantially. The modernisation 
of infrastructure (public utilities, transport and communi-
cations) has also made great progress. This latter trend is 
modernisation in its most direct, technical sense: the acqui-
sition of the most advanced technology. It appears that the 
public administration is better equipped to deal with this 
situation than, say, to resolve property disputes, as infra-
structural improvement measures can be planned in an 
integral fashion and implemented by means of a "cam-
paign". The number of telephone connections in East Ger-
many, for instance, trebled between 1989 and 1994, accom-
plishing in five years a process that took around 15 years in 
West Germany (from 1960 to 1975). The number of private 
cars has virtually doubled, equivalent to the West German 
trend between approximately 1970 and 1983. 
On the other hand, a central process of the social market 
economy has proved immune to acceleration: the creation 
of new and the modernisation of existing productive plant. 
Instead of market development what occurred was the 
"market shock"; the collapse of markets, networks and 
production locations. Many economists had suffered from 
the illusion that merely dismantling the command eco-
nomy and privatising productive enterprises would initiate 
an economic expansion. It has been an important lesson 
that markets do not arise spontaneously, but must be 
laboriously constructed. 
IV. Reactions 
How have East and West Germans reacted to the rapid 
changes in East Germany? Indeed, have there actually 
been perceptible changes in West Germany? West Ger-
many, the "old" Federal Republic, did not experience a 
dramatic acceleration of social developments, neither dur-
ing the 1980s nor after 1989. The most striking socio-
structural trend was the rise in female employment, al-
though it remained far below the level in the GDR or in 
Scandinavian countries. In the short term labour market 
problems arose due to the influx of asylum-seekers and 
ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe. At the political level 
the Green Party and ecological topics managed to establish 
themselves. In economic terms the "unification boom" over-
shadowed the global economic recession for a year or two. 
West Germany were not especially interested in the 
GDR. As late as December 1989 a minority of just 37% were 
in favour of the formation of a "single state", while 50% 
argued for a confederation of "two separate states". This 
split within public opinion is partly explained by differ-
ences in the degree of personal contact among West Ger-
mans. Only a third of them had relatives or friends in the 
GDR and just 20% of them had visited the GDR or had 
received visitors from there during the past few years. Even 
after unification, in 1993 70% ofWest Germans stated that 
they would not wish to repeat unification again in its 1990 
form. For more than 50% unification occurred too quickly, 
around 20% considered, in retrospect, the retention of two 
states to be the better solution. 
In 1993 the author conducted, within the framework of 
representative surveys, two tests aimed at evaluating Ger-
man unification. The first consisted of a simple question 
within the context of a comprehensive survey of objective 
living conditions and subjective well-being (Welfare Survey 
1993): "Have your living conditions improved, deteriorated 
or remained more or less stable since 1990". The responses 
in East and West differ strikingly (responses in%): 
Improved 
Deteriorated 
No significant change 
West 
10 
31 
59 
East 
48 
23 
29 
No great difference for the majority of West Germans: this 
is in line with the impression ofWest German indifference. 
Yet 31% reported a deterioration, significantly more than 
in East Germany. This largely reflects a feeling of discom-
fort with the uncertainty of the general situation, as per-
sonal living conditions were generally described as good, 
and an optimistic view was taken of personal prospects for 
the future. This disenchantment was more pronounced 
among women than men, correlates positively with age and 
is greatest among the lower status, income and educational 
groups. It is closely correlated with individual anxiety, 
fears and symptoms of anomie. 
The picture for East German respondents, by contrast, is 
overwhelmingly positive; to an above-average extent for 
men, the younger age groups, employees in the service 
sector and the better educated. How can this positive 
overall evaluation in East Germany be squared with the 
upheaval and destruction described earlier? It is the conse-
quence of a significant improvement in welfare for the 
majority of people, in terms of both objective living condi-
tions and subjective well-being. At the same time, this 
means that the minority of- objective and subjective-
"losers" become even more marginalised. In a society that 
suffered from scarcity for many years, the rise in real 
incomes and opportunities for consumption are clearly of 
central importance. Yet environmental and housing condi-
tions have also improved perceptibly. As far as subjective 
well-being is concerned, anxiety, uncertainty and anomie 
(phenomena that are by no means seldom in West Ger-
many!) are on the decline. This implies that self-confidence 
is now growing; East Germans are "finding their way 
around" the new institutions. 
An additional interesting insight is provided by a second 
test. We questioned East and West Germans as to their 
evaluation of the economic and political system "prior to 
unification", "today" (April/May 1993) and "in five years". 
West Germans take a very positive view of both the 
economy and politics of the "old" Federal Republic, and 
perceive a massive current deterioration, one that is 
scarcely expected to improve in the next five years. East 
Germans take a clearly negative view of the economic and 
political system of the GDR; their evaluation of the current 
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situation is more positive and they expect a further im-
provement in the future. There is, however, a significant 
difference between the evaluation of the political and of the 
economic situation. East Germans already take a more 
positive view of the economic system than West Germans. 
But with regard to the political system there is only a slight 
improvement at present, one expected to gradually con-
tinue in future. West Germans perceive a serious threat to 
the political and economic system familiar to them. East 
Germans appreciate the market economy, but are not 
enthusiastic about democracy as practised in Bonn. This is 
paradoxical in that the contribution to reconstruction made 
by public transfers and the public administration are much 
greater than that of private investment. Here, too, the 
explanation is to be found in political culture. The state-
ment "The state is responsible for ensuring basic subsist-
ence" is accepted by 32% ofWest Germans, compared with 
61% ofEast Germans, whereas 68% ofWest Germans but 
just 39% of East Germans believe that "individuals are 
themselves responsible". Thus, in East Germany, collecti-
vist attitudes and fears of economic problems combine to 
produce an unfavourable evaluation of the political system 
of the new Federal Republic. Whenever questions are posed 
relating to social security one encounters criticism, but 4 7% 
ofWest Germans regard social security as sufficient, com-
pared to just 24% of East Germans, of whom no less than 
97% report, retrospectively, that social security had been 
guaranteed in the GDR. As many as 42% ofWest Germans 
believe that public order is secure, compared to just 13% of 
East Germans, 80% of whom reported that public order had 
been guaranteed in the GDR. 
It seems, therefore, that East German citizens are mov-
ing more rapidly towards the institutions and values of the 
market economy than towards those of democracy. West 
Germans have long accepted both, although they detect a 
significant deterioration since unification. 
V. Stabilisation 
In 1989 everyone was surprised by the pace at which the 
GDR collapsed. In 1990 the velocity was maintained by 
popular exit and voice and by pressure from West German 
government. Since then, criticism of the way in which 
East German transformation and German unification 
took place has largely been a critique of the speed at which 
it occurred. In retrospect it is widely believed that a slower 
speed and thus greater scope for steering would have been 
better and should be sought for future developments. 
What is certainly clear is that the aim of a rapid equalisa-
tion of living conditions in East and West Germany is 
unrealistic and thus counterproductive. In the course of a 
hopeless race, endogenous development potential will 
only be buried and, more especially, alternatives to west-
ern practices will be blocked, as will the reform of the 
western model itself. It therefore seems more realistic for 
East Germany to "go its own way" rather than merely to 
"catch up". The prime minister of the state of Saxony, Kurt 
Biedenkopf, in particular, has championed this position. 
"The model calculations show that a rapid equalisation of 
living conditions, defined in economic terms, in East and 
West Germany is objectively unattainable. It is totally 
unclear how a population that is to experience within the 
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space of less than a decade, an economic development for 
which western Germany took 30 to 40 years will react." 
Consequently Biedenkopf argues for greater regionalisa-
tion of the unification process and for a different "mix" of 
economic and non-economic factors in determining the 
quality of life. He believes that competition between re-
gions offers the best hope for overcoming "sclerosis and 
stagnation" in West Germany. 
In my view we have now, five years after unification, in 
any case reached the point at which the rapid pace of 
change in East Germany is weakening, while the pressure 
for change in West Germany is perceptible increasing. The 
demographic and labour market contractions have, to a 
certain extent at least, come to an end, migration now 
occurs in both directions and even the party political 
structure has now become established to a surprising 
degree. Further indications of a perceptible stabilisation 
are provided by a survey conducted in October 1994 in 
which the questions as to "living conditions since 1990" 
and the evaluation of the economic and political system 
were repeated. The proportion of West Germans reporting 
that their situation had on balance "deteriorated" fell (to 
19%), while the improvement in East Germany became 
even more apparent (59%). Meanwhile East German scep-
ticism regarding the political system weakened and West 
German pessimism regarding the economic system eased. 
East Germans and West Germans are drawing closer 
together. 
In international comparative terms East Germany is in 
the front ranks as regards the level of popular support for 
the market economy and democracy, although it is not the 
leader among the post-communist countries. If satisfaction 
with one's personal economic situation is added to this to 
form an "index of transformation", East Germany moves up 
to second place behind the Czech Republic. Thus the direc-
tion seems to be clear. Yet it appears equally clear to me 
that the differences between East and West Germany in 
terms of a "regionally specific consciousness" will not dis-
appear in the near future. The question is whether it really 
will take an entire generation before, alongside the already 
tangible benefits, the losses that inevitably accompanied a 
transformation at such speed can be overcome. 
Wolfgang Zapf 
The author is scientific director of the WZB. The article is an abridged 
and revised version of an essay published in E. Holtmann/H. Sahner 
(ed.), Aufhebung der Bipolaritat, Opladen 1995, pp. 69-81. Additional 
references are also to be found there. 
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Neither Convergence nor Mezzogiorno: 
Regional Disparities in East Germany 
Regional labour market disparities have arisen very swiftly in East 
Germany. Rural areas and the areas situated close to the former border 
with West Germany exhibit a particularly unfavourable development. 
The situation in regions with large urban centres is relatively favour-
able. In the light of these findings, developments in East Germany 
conform neither to a "convergence" nor to a "Mezzogiorno" scenario. 
Most appropriate to describe the future development of East Germany 
would appear to be a divergence scenario: some areas in the new Lander 
will reach western standards relatively quickly, whereas others are 
destined to lag far behind. 
The academic and public debate on 
the economic development of East 
Germany is characterised by both 
positive and negative expectations. In 
their extreme form, these can be ex-
pressed in the form of two scenarios. 
Within the framework of a conver-
gence scenario it is expected that East 
Germany will achieve western pro-
ductivity and employment standards 
within the space of a few years. In-
deed, in the initial euphoria immedi-
ately after unification it was widely 
believed that an "economic miracle" 
would occur, quickly bringing about 
convergent development. 
Proponents of the opposing view 
believe that such a catching-up proc-
ess will take many years if, indeed, it 
comes about at all. They point to the 
political and economic burdens that 
could be imposed on German govern-
ment, particularly West German gov-
ernment, if a large area of the country 
remains economically backward in 
the longer term. Given that the eco-
nomic division ofthe country in such a 
scenario is reminiscent of the situa-
tion in Italy, this pessimistic view is 
sometimes termed the "Mezzogiorno 
scenario". 
Both scenarios have one thing in 
common: they treat East and West 
Germany as two separate units, per-
mitting no differentiation within 
each part of the country. This undif-
ferentiated view will be abandoned in 
the following contribution, which will 
look at the development of regional 
labour markets within East Ger-
many. Is it really to be expected that 
East Germany will, as a relatively 
homogeneous unit, develop in one or 
other of the two directions? Or is 
there evidence of regional dispari-
ties, rendering both scenarios inap-
propriate? 
The empirical basis for deter-
mining regional disparities 
The spatial unit of analysis used in the 
following are the so-called labour 
market regions, as used within the 
framework of regional policy in order 
to delineate problem areas. Labour 
market regions are based largely on 
analyses of commuter movements 
and consist of a labour market centre 
with its corresponding catchment 
area. 
The data have been derived from 
the Workforce Survey of the former 
GDR State Central Administration 
for Statistics, the "employment statis-
tics" (Beschaftigtenstatistik) of the 
Federal Labour Office (which do not 
include the self-employed and civil 
servants) and the unemployment sta-
tistics. The observation period begins 
with the survey date of the Workforce 
Survey, 30 September 1989, and ends 
on 30 June 1993. Thus the study is 
restricted to the initial transforma-
tion phase. In 1994 the boundaries of 
many regions (districts) in East Ger-
many were altered, so that more re-
cent data are no longer comparable 
with those of the Workforce Survey. 
An additional problem in compar-
ing the Workforce Survey (WS) with 
the new employment statistics is the 
top secret, so-called "Area X" in the 
GDR, which covered, among other 
things, the military, the police and the 
secret service. Given that Area X, 
with an estimated 700,000 employees 
is not included in the Workforce Sur-
vey, the following analyses under-
state the real decline in employment. 
Our analysis is based on a fall in 
employment of 37.7%, from 8.5 mil-
lion (WS 1989) to 5.3 million (employ-
ment statistics 1993); in both cases 
the figures do not include trainees. If 
the estimated figure for Area X is 
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added to the WS, the decline in em-
ployment amounts to 42%. 
The contraction of employment 
As can be seen from the Table, the 
decline in employment between Sep-
tember 1989 and June 1993 was sub-
stantial in all regions. Even so, signifi-
cant differences are revealed. The de-
cline in employment was least severe 
in Potsdam, at 18%, and in Dresden 
(31%). At the other extreme we find 
Klotze/Salzwedel with employment 
losses of 50%. Sharp differences in 
regional development have clearly 
emerged within the space ofless than 
four years. 
If the labour market regions are 
divided into three types according to 
their settlement density and central-
ity, and the extent of the decline in 
employment is compared in the three 
groups, it is apparent that the heavily 
urbanised areas, with an average fig-
ure of36%, performed marginally bet-
ter than the areas of medium urban 
density (37%; excluding Potsdam: 
39%) and significantly better than the 
less urbanised regions, where em-
ployment losses averaged 43%. A 
marked gap between town and coun-
try is thus evident with respect to the 
extent of the decline in employment; 
given the largely agrarian structure 
of the North and the heayy industri-
alisation of the South of the former 
GDR, thisisatthesametimeaNorth-
South divide. 
Regional unemployment 
In June 1993 the regional unemploy-
ment rates varied between 10% in 
Potsdam and 25% in Ueckermiinde 
(cf. Table). The incidence of unem-
ployment varies only marginally 
with settlement structure. The aver-
age unemployment rates in the three 
regional groups are 14%, 15% and 
17%. 
The statistical correlation between 
the regional unemployment rate and 
the regional decline in employment is 
not particularly close; the correlation 
coefficient is 0.58. This shows that 
regional job losses are reflected to 
varying degrees in regional unem-
ployment because commuting, migra-
tion and labour market policy meas-
ures partly compensate for the decline 
in employment (cf. East Germany, 
No. 3-4, pp. 14-15). This is particu-
larly apparent in the areas along the 
former border with West Germany. 
Here, employment losses and the un-
employment rate differ markedly; a 
Regional Labour Market and Income Indicators 
Employment Unemployment Daily income 
change rate per capita 
9/1989-6/1993 6/1993 1993 
Labour market region (%) (%) (DM) 
Potsdam -18.1 9.8 87 
Dresden -31.3 13.0 82 
Frankfurt (Oder) -33.4 14.4 81 
Berlin -34.3 13.1 91 
Magdeburg -34.7 15.8 83 
Halle/Merseburg -34.8 15.5 82 
Rostock -34.9 16.4 84 
Schwerin -34.9 13.6 82 
Leipzig -35.0 13.5 84 
Erfurt!We~ar -35.0 15.6 82 
Jena -35.5 11.3 81 
Cottbus -36.1 14.8 85 
Neubrandenburg -36.3 17.4 81 
Gera -37.4 16.4 79 
Zwickau -38.5 14.7 77 
Stralsund 38.9 17.9 78 
Eisenhiittenstadt -40.0 12.3 81 
Eberswalde -40.3 17.3 80 
Greifswald -40.5 17.8 80 
Chemnitz 40.6 15.1 77 
Bautzen -41.0 15.5 79 
Schwedt COder) -41.3 20.8 80 
Plauen -41.4 13.8 75 
Finsterwalde -41.6 16.9 76 
Brandenburg -42.9 17.6 79 
Stendal -43.2 17.4 79 
Wittenberg 43.9 15.8 76 
Suhl -44.0 14.5 78 
Wismar -44.4 15.6 81 
Riesa -44.7 15.7 76 
Quedlinburg -44.8 18.3 78 
Eisenach -45.0 16.3 77 
Dessau -45.7 19.3 80 
Nordhausen -45.7 18.8 78 
Neuruppin -46.0 19.5 78 
Pritzwalk -46.6 20.6 76 
Garlitz -47.0 15.9 77 
Saalfeld -47.2 13.4 77 
Miihlhausen -47.4 17.7 76 
Ueckermiinde -48.4 24.5 76 
Klotze!Salzwedel -49.7 13.8 78 
East Germany -37.7 15.2 82 
Sources: Employee Survey 9/1989, Employee Statistics 6/1993, Unemployment 
Statistics 6/1993. 
good example is the Klotze/Salzwedel 
region, in which the employment 
losses were the highest in the whole of 
East Germany, while the unemploy-
ment rate was below average. These 
results primarily reflect the large 
number of East Germans commuting 
to work in West Germany (cf. East 
Germany, No. 14, p. 10). 
Regional average wages 
Regional income disparities - here 
measured in terms of average daily 
wages in 1993 - are relatively minor 
in the new federal states (cf. Table). 
East Berlin stands out from the 
rest in tel1ll$ of income level. Here 
wages are alteady rapidly approach-
ing West qennan levels. This is 
hardly surpnsmg given that East 
and West Berlin form a single labour 
market and that spatial wage differ-
entiation cannot be sustained in a 
single market for long. 
Even so there is an unexpectedly 
strong correlation between the re-
gional average wage and the regional 
decline in employment: the greater 
the extent of job losses the lower the 
average regional wage (the correla-
tion coefficient is 0.76). Clearly, re-
gional labour market problems have 
a greater impact on the regional 
wage level than in West Germany. 
Consequently the regions suffering 
the largest employment losses face 
cumulative disadvantages. Workers 
in such areas not only face a higher 
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risk of losing their job, the monetary 
return on their labour is also lower. 
The state, too, is affected in two 
ways: due both to the unfavourable 
employment trend and the lower 
wages the tax revenue for state and 
local government is particularly low 
in the disadvantaged areas. 
Analysis of regional employment 
trends 
Of the three problem trends de-
scribed above, the regional decline in 
employment is of central importance 
as it exerts a decisive influence on 
regional unemployment and also on 
regional wage disparities. This justi-
fies closer analysis of regional em-
ployment losses. In which regions are 
branch-specific employment trends 
in line with the East German aver-
age, in which have they been more, 
and in which less favourable? 
In order to provide an answer to 
these questions it is necessary first 
to determine, for each region, the 
employment trend that would have 
occurred if all the branches located 
in the region had expanded or con-
tracted to the same extent as in East 
Germany as a whole ("shift-share 
analysis"). As the result of this first 
step we obtain the so-called "struc-
tural effect" of the employment 
trend. If this is then subtracted from 
the trends that actually occurred in 
each region, we obtain the so-called 
"location effect". The location effect 
describes the deviations by each re-
gion from the branch-specific devel-
opments in East Germany as a 
whole. To put it another way, the lo-
cation effect measures the develop-
mental strength or weakness of indi-
vidual regions (largely) independ-
ently of their industrial structure. 
The map (p. 16) shows which areas 
enjoyed a positive and which suffered 
a negative location effect. The follow-
ing results are of note. The figures for 
regions located near the border to 
West Germany tend to be unfavour-
able (Suhl, Miihlhausen, Nordhau-
sen, Quedlinburg, Klotze/Salzwedel). 
This is a surprising result. It would 
seem plausible to have assumed that 
those areas bordering on - prosper-
ous - West Germany would perform 
better. Yet precisely the opposite is 
the case. The West German border 
regions do not appear to have pro-
vided a positive impulse for develop-
ments in East Germany. 
Moreover, the analysis also shows 
that those areas situated near the 
Polish border also tend to be in a less 
favourable position (in particular 
Ueckermtinde, Garlitz, Eberswalde). 
15 
TRENDS 
Urban areas perform markedly 
better than rural areas. During the 
observation period the urban cen-
tres, particular those in the South 
(Dresden, Leipzig), while clearly suf-
fering from labour market problems, 
enjoy a far more favourable labour 
market situation than the remaining 
areas. 
The figure for East Berlin, on the 
other hand, suggests an unfavourable 
trend. The same is true of many rural 
areas, particularly those situated 
north of Berlin (in Brandenburg and 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern). 
The role of public capital 
spending 
Detailed comparison between the 
overall location effect and the re-
gional development of individual 
branches (branch-specific location ef-
fect) reveals an interesting picture. 
Generally the location effect is corre-
lated with the development of serv-
ices in the following areas: govern-
ment, transport/communications, fi-
nancial institutions/insurance com-
panies and trade. These, then, are 
the branches that determine the rela-
tive position of regions in East Ger-
many. 
Surprisingly, manufacturing in-
dustry is not among the branches 
considered "important" for regional 
employment trends. Thus the rela-
tive favourable development of many 
urban areas is due only to a minor 
extent to the existence of traditional 
industrial production locations. 
What is decisive, rather, is that ad-
ministrative responsibilities are con-
centrated in the state capitals of the 
new Lander and that services, which 
expanded rapidly as a result of the 
bottled up demand and inadequate 
supply, have grown primarily in ur-
ban areas. 
Consequently, public capital 
spending clearly plays a key role in 
economic stabilisation at regional 
level. The modernisation of the ma-
terial infrastructure and the estab-
lishment of a new public administra-
tion, particularly in state capitals, 
exerts a positive impact. Such devel-
opments then induce additional eco-
nomic activity as the demand fi-
nanced out of public funds induces 
additional demand: firms receiving 
government orders pay their employ-
ees wages and salaries, income that 
is to a large extent spent in the im-
mediate region. Regional multiplier 
processes of this type indicate that to 
a large extent regional development 
differentials reflect political deci-
sions. 
The role of the private sector 
The central role played by govern-
ment must come as a disappointment 
Employment Trends According to Location Effect, September 
1989 - June 1993 (in ~) 
16 
Min.: -9.7% (Kliitze/ 
Salzwedel) 
Max.: 14.4% (Potsdam) 
(Number of regions in 
parentheses) 
li 
D 
D . 
less than -3% (14) 
-:l% to less than 3% 
<21) 
:l% and more (6) 
Sources: Employee Survey 9/89, 
Employee Statistics 6/93. 
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to those who had pinned their hopes 
on the private sector. For even in the 
relativelywell-offregions-duringthe 
observation period at least - there is 
no evidence of the "economic miracle" 
that had originally been anticipated, 
one based on an economic dynamic 
emanating from the private sector. 
At the same time the results sug-
gest that, in addition to government 
activity, endogenous economic proc-
esses have also exerted a polarising 
effect on regional labour markets. It 
seems that areas containing urban 
centres are better able to withstand 
the crisis, irrespective of public sector 
activity. Agglomeration effects play 
an important role here: areas in which 
a certain volume of economic activity 
has remained or- even better- more 
than marginal progress has been 
made in reconstruction tend to attract 
additional investors seeking to take 
advantage of the proximity to already 
developed markets. They expect that 
progress in infrastructural develop-
ment is more likely to be made in such 
areas. Networks of interaction de-
velop between firms and between 
firms, institutions and the regional 
labour force that are conducive to fur-
ther economic activity. 
This is in contrast to the largely 
rural areas and those areas situated 
on the western and, to a lesser extent, 
on the eastern border of the new fed-
eral states. Here the economic col-
lapse assumed even more dramatic 
forms than elsewhere. The West Ger-
man border regions - in themselves 
structurally weak - provided no im-
pulses for economic development east 
of the former border. Even in those 
areas in the West where industrial 
centres were situated near the former 
border, they failed to exert a positive 
effect on development in neighbour-
ing areas in the East: Wolfsburg, for 
example, dominated by the VW auto-
mobile plant, borders on Klotze/ 
Salzwedel, the East German region 
with the most serious job losses. 
The problem is revealed particu-
larly starkly in Berlin. The labour 
market region "East Berlin" recorded 
a negative location effect. In this case 
the positive tendencies linked with 
East Berlin's position as the largest 
urban centre in the new federal states 
are actually more than offset. This is 
at least partly explained by the role of 
West Berlin as East Berlin's economi-
cally "overbearing" neighbour, al-
though the western half of the city is 
still struggling with the legacy of its 
former "island" status: the end of the 
government subsidies granted over 
decades in order to offset the loca-
tional disadvantage faced by West 
Berlin exposed the lack of competi-
1 
tiveness of many branches operating 
, in the city. Yet despite this the eastern 
:half of the city has proved unable to 
keep pace with West Berlin ( cf. East 
Germany, No. 8, pp. 10-12). 
The same applies to regions located 
near the border or lacking an urban 
centre. They are unable to compete 
with urban areas, not to mention the 
West German regions. In many cases 
the decline in the border areas has hit 
services particularly hard because 
services can be purchased in West 
German regions located just across 
the border. The near-by centres in 
West Germany and the small or me-
dium-sized towns in East Germany do 
not constitute growth poles in the 
sense that they pull along the sur-
rounding area at a faster pace. Thus 
the results suggest that it is with-
drawal and crowding-out processes 
that have predominated in such ar-
eas, exacerbating regional polarisa-
tion. 
Here too, there is evidence that this 
process has been influenced by politi-
cal decisions. In those areas situated 
close to the former border with West 
Germany the East German popula-
tion has the option of seeking employ-
ment opportunities in the West. Con-
sequently, supportive action by eco-
nomic policy is not considered to be as 
urgent as in other areas. 
Outlook 
One thing is certain: the existing 
disparities will not disappear as 
quickly as they have arisen. Interna-
tional comparative studies have, it is 
true, shown the existence of a gener-
alised trend towards the equalisa-
tion of regional differences. Barro et 
al., for instance, have estimated that 
regional productivity differences 
halve over a period of around 35 
years (cf. East Germany, No. 13, 
pp. 10-11). Moreover, in the case of 
East Germany it can be assumed 
that the massive provision of public 
financial resources will exert a 
strong influence on the pace of de-
velopment. Yet even so, the proc-
esses of equalisation are proceeding 
far more slowly than the polarisa-
tion processes that set in after the 
overnight exposure of the new fed-
eral states to the global market. 
Consequently, the regional dispari-
ties observed within East Germany 
will initially be maintained. 
The new Lander are currently en-
joying relatively high growth rates. 
Although it is not to be expected that 
these rates will remain at this level 
permanently, high levels of invest-
ment (investment in plant and equip-
ment is estimated at 52% of GDP in 
1994 and 54% in 1995) and the mas-
sive support coming from West Ger-
many (estimated net transfer in 1994: 
DM 126 billion; 1995: DM 150 billion) 
will ensure a development trend that 
will continue to reduce the gap be-
tween East and West. 
From these developments - high 
rates of growth for East Germany as a 
whole and the continuation of re-
gional disparities within the area -it 
can be concluded that the East-West 
divide will increasingly give way to 
smaller-scale spatial disparities. It 
seems plausible to expect a scenario in 
which the large urban centres stead-
ily approach western standards in 
terms of productivity and infrastruc-
ture, while large areas of East Ger-
many lag far behind. 
Thus neither a convergence nor a 
Mezzogiorno scenario, but rather a 
divergence scenario is appropriate to 
East German developments, whereby 
the term "divergence" refers not to the 
relationship between East and West 
Germany, but rather to developments 
within East Germany itself: some ar-
eas will reach western levels rela-
tively quickly, whereas others lag way 
behind. 
To a certain extent regional devel-
opment differences are normal in a 
market economy. Such differences 
also exist in West Germany, although 
they are less pronounced here than in 
other West European countries. Di-
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rect comparisons with the situation in 
East Germany are, however, difficult 
in view of the on-going process of 
transformation. Given the depth of 
the regional disparities observed, 
though, it seems probably that they 
will remain more pronounced than in 
West Germany. 
Uwe Blien, Franziska Hirschenauer 
The authors are researchers at the Institut 
fur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung at 
the Federal Labour Office (lAB) in Nurem-
burg. The contribution is based on a more 
comprehensive study in which, in particular, 
methodological details are discussed at 
greater length than is possible here. 
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The EC Structural Funds- The Integration of East 
Germany into the European Support System 
The transformation process in the new federal states has received 
substantial financial support from the European Community since 
1991. Due to the specific conditions characterising the transformation 
and the necessity of establishing new administrative structures, the 
activities of the structural funds encountered a number of problems 
during the first support period from 1991 to 1993. Besides such proce-
dural-technical difficulties, fundamental criticism of the utilisation of 
EC funds within the framework of a national support policy was raised, 
as the argument over the cofinancing of Regional Fund measures has 
shown. To some extent this has led to modifications in the way support 
is being provided during the second support period (1994 to 1999). 
Over the past five years wide-ranging 
economic and labour market policy 
programmes have accompanied the 
East German transformation process. 
From an early point in time national 
efforts were supplemented by funding 
from the European Community; aid 
was made available quickly and 
unbureaucratically in 1991 once the 
adjustment difficulties had become 
apparent. Of central importance in 
this context are the European struc-
tural funds: the economic policy ori-
ented regional fund (ERDF), the la-
bour market policy oriented social 
fund (ESF), the agricultural fund 
EAGGF, which focuses on agricul-
tural developments, and, since 1994, 
the newly created guidance fund for 
the fishing industry (FIAF). They are 
the most important instruments of 
European structural policy, their aim 
being to reduce regional imbalances 
within Europe and to promote eco-
nomic and social cohesion in the Euro-
pean Union. 
During the first support phase 
(1991 to 1993) the new Lander and 
East Berlin were initially treated as a 
special case for EC structural policy 
and were integrated into the Euro-
pean support measures in the middle 
of the current programme period. The 
time-consuming planning procedures 
were dispensed with and an addi-
tional budgetary allowance was 
made. EC resources of around ECU 3 
billion (approx. DM 6 billion) were 
made available via the structural 
funds during this period. Not until the 
start of the second support period, 
from 1994 to 1999, did East Germany 
become a target area under standard 
EC structural policies. This not only 
increased the number of instruments 
that can be deployed, more impor-
tantly the funding volume was also 
expanded substantially. Following 
the special treatment in the previous 
period, the new Lander including 
East Berlin now officially enjoy the 
status of a target 1 region and thus, 
alongside other underdeveloped re-
gions in the EU, are accorded top pri-
ority in the provision of funding and 
the maximum support conditions. A 
total of almost ECU 14 billion (DM 27 
billion) has been earmarked for the 
second support phase. 
In accordance with the principle of 
"additionality" the structural funds 
are deployed in support of the efforts 
made by federal and state govern-
ments. The ERDF, for instance, is 
linked to the joint federal-state gov-
ernment programme "Improving re-
gional economic structure" (GA). The 
agricultural fund, EAGGF, provides 
supplementary funding for the joint 
programme "Improving agricultural 
structure and coastal protection". 
The resources of the ESF are divided 
between federal and state govern-
ments. Around a quarter are made 
available to the Federal Labour Of-
fice in order to finance measures that 
cannot receive support under the 
German Labour Promotion Act 
(LPA), in particular for preventive 
further training for those still in 
work, and additional benefits for un-
employed participants in further 
training schemes. The remaining 
ESF resources are made available di-
rectly to state governments in sup-
port of their labour market policy ef-
forts and programmes ( cf. the reports 
on the structural funds in East Ger-
many, No. 3-4, pp. 9-10 and, No. 10, 
pp. 10-12). 
Including national cofinancing, the 
European Commission estimates that 
between 1991 and 1993 overall spend-
ing of around ECU 14 billion was real-
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ised. A total of 300,000 people are 
estimated to have participated in la-
bour market policy measures sup-
ported by the ESF. According to fig-
ures provided by assisted firms, the 
investment support provided by the 
ERDF has maintained or created 
around 200,000 jobs; in view of the 
lack of adequate evaluations and the 
possibility of deadweight, however, 
this figure should be treated with 
great caution. In retrospect the Com-
mission took a "positive overall" view 
of the results achieved during the first 
support period. However, the deploy-
ment of European structural support 
experienced a number of problems, 
and criticisms were raised, in particu-
lar by the European Court of Audi-
tors; most of them were due to the 
difficulties of the transformation 
process in the wake of unification and 
the inadequacies of an administration 
that at the time was only just being 
established. As the disagreement per-
taining to the ERDF showed, how-
ever, there was also fundamental 
criticism of national support policies. 
The disagreement surrounding 
cofinancing of the Regional 
Fund 
Criticism of the first support period 
centres on the integration of re-
sources made available by the ERDF 
into the joint programme "Improving 
regional economic structure" (GA), a 
regional policy programme in exist-
ence in the Federal Republic since 
1970 and planned and financed jointly 
by federal and state government. In 
view of the urgency of the problems 
and the lack of alternatives, there was 
initially no controversy over the deci-
sion to resort to this national co-
financing instrument, in particular as 
it enabled the available resources to 
be distributed as quickly as possible. 
In the course of negotiations on the 
second support period, however, this 
procedural approach led to sharp 
disagreement between the Commis-
sion and the federal government. 
Underlying the dispute are differ-
ent approaches to support policy and 
a critique of the GA that was voiced 
not least by German institutions, in 
particular the environment minis-
tries, environmental groups and a 
number of federal states, especially 
Saxony. Experts were of the opinion 
that the strict incorporation ofERDF 
resources into the GA restricted the 
flexibility and the breadth ofEC sup-
port deployment and thus unneces-
sarily tightened the conditions under 
which EU funding could be granted. 
In addition, in contrast to the ap-
proach taken in West Germany, re-
gional support through the GA in 
East Germany was not concentrated 
on specific regions or areas, nor were 
the conditions of entitlement differ-
entiated to take account of regional 
economic strength; critics have taken 
the view that this amounts to support 
on the "watering-can principle". The 
central bone of contention between 
the Commission and the federal gov-
ernment were the tight limits on the 
spectrum of support under the GA, 
which focuses on promoting indus-
trial firms and economically relevant 
infrastructure and thus in particular 
on the now highly controversial crea-
tion of trading and industrial estates 
on greenfield sites. In the view ofthe 
European Court of Auditors, among 
others, this has served to finance the 
creation of a significant oversupply of 
commercial sites and has failed to 
focus efforts on the creation of jobs 
with a viable future. 
In the light of this, the Commission 
considered that the national policy 
approach lacked differentiation and it 
favoured a concept for the second sup-
port period in which the ERDF and 
the GA would have been largely 
"decoupled", enabling EC funding to 
be used for other areas, such as agri-
culture, research and technology, 
education and the environment. In 
East Germany this critique was taken 
up by the state of Saxony, in particu-
lar, which has sought to tie ERDF 
resources more closely into areas it 
considers most urgent within the con-
text of state-level policies and, espe-
cially, environmental policy. 
In the end the federal government 
and the Commission reached a com-
promise under which state govern-
ments are permitted to decouple 
ERDF funding from the GA to some 
extent. For 1995/96 the state govern-
ments can decide whether the frame-
work of GA regulations is to remain 
in force or whether at least a partial 
decoupling should occur. So far 
Saxony has taken the most far-
reaching step: from 1995 it is state 
funds that will provide the national 
cofinancing; only 40% is to come 
from the GA. Support is to focus on 
measures to improve the environ-
ment and in the area of research and 
development. The other new federal 
states, however, have made scarcely 
any use of the so-called "flexibility 
clause". 
In a report for the Commission the 
Deutsche Institut fUr Wirtschaftsfor-
schung (German Institute for Eco-
nomic Research - DIW) argued for 
the new, more flexible solution and 
proposed that between 5% and 10% of 
ERDF resources should be made 
available outside the GA. The Insti-
tute took the view that for pragmatic 
reasons the remainder of the struc-
tural fund resources should remain 
tied to the GA: in view of their tight 
budgetary situation, most federal 
states would experience problems in 
finding national cofinancing re-
sources, if the funds were decoupled 
to a greater extent, and they are con-
cerned about additional administra-
tive burdens, if new state-level pro-
grammes need to be set up and then 
coordinated with the ERDF. Change 
is required, according to the DIW, es-
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pecially in certain specific areas, 
such as support for technology and 
innovation transfer and environmen-
tal protection. In the medium term it 
is also argued that the degree of re-
gional differentiation should be in-
creased in such a way to allow for the 
creation of regional economic cen-
tres. 
Objections raised by the 
European Court of Auditors 
Particularly in the initial support pe-
riod, numerous "procedural-techni-
cal" problems arose due to the need to 
set up new administrative structures 
and the lack of specialist know-how 
among those administering the funds 
in the relevant departments. The Eu-
ropean Court of Auditors conducted 
Table 1: The Activities of the European Structural Funds in East Germany: 
Earmarked Resources and Resources Placed, 1991-1993 
Fund Earmarked Resources 
resources spent as of 
(million ECU) 31.12.1993 as a% 
of earmarked 
resources 
East Germany Total 3,147.1 84.4 
ERDF 1,598.5 83.1 
ESF: 
-state 
programmes0 695.5 89.7 
- FLQ2l 248.2 92.5 
EAGGF 595.0 77.9 
Technical assistance3l 10.0 100.0 
Federal states: 
Berlin (East) Total 214.9 54.1 
ERDF 162.7 43.6 
ESF 51.4 87.1 
EAGGF 0.7 69.5 
Brandenburg Total 489.5 84.7 
ERDF 250.7 86.4 
ESF 114.4 92.3 
EAGGF 124.4 74.5 
Mecklenburg- Total 426.6 84.6 
Vorpommern ERDF 185.3 86.4 
ESF 88.4 74.5 
EAGGF 152.9 88.2 
Saxony Total 773.4 86.6 
ERDF 464.1 86.4 
ESF 201.6 92.5 
EAGGF 107.6 76.3 
Sachsen-Anhalt Total 529.3 84.4 
ERDF 280.3 86.4 
ESF 126.8 92.1 
EAGGF 122.2 72.0 
Thuringia Total 455.3 89.6 
ERDF 255.4 93.2 
ESF 112.9 92.5 
EAGGF 87.1 75.3 
1) ESF resources distributed by the federal states 
2) ESF resources distributed by the Federal Labour Office 
3) Financed supplementarily by the ERDF 
Source: European Court of Auditors. 
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an investigation in the new federal 
states which revealed numerous defi-
ciencies in the way resources were 
granted and the structural funds ad-
ministered; in certain cases the find-
ings were even passed on to the public 
prosecutor. The criticisms centred on 
inadequate controls and project 
evaluation, inadmissible accounting 
procedures and the frequent infringe-
ment of regulations governing the 
placing of public orders and environ-
mental protection. Accordingly, the 
recommendations made by the Court 
of Auditors called for improved re-
source administration and more in-
tensive controlling. 
At the end of the first support pe-
riod, around 84% of the structural 
fund resources earmarked had been 
spent; this is broadly in line with the 
European average. The only excep-
tion to this was ERDF funding in 
East Berlin, of which just 44% was 
actually placed (cf. Table 1). This was 
due, among other things, to the rela-
tive preponderance of non-privatised 
Treuhand-firms, whose investment 
activity was extremely restrained. 
Moreover, the fact that a dispropor-
tionate number of the firms sup-
ported there were in the service sec-
tor meant that the capital intensity 
of the jobs promoted was low. Very 
few new firms have set up in East 
Berlin, reflecting the unfavourable 
conditions for production in an urban 
conglomeration: the lack of commer-
cial sites and high real estate prices. 
Firms in branches requiring large 
sites were attracted to other regions 
or to the area around Berlin. 
Little coordination of the use of 
resources from the structural 
funds 
According to the principles of the 1989 
reform of the structural funds, the 
European Community places great 
emphasis on interaction between the 
structural funds, in particular be-
tween the ERDF and the ESF in 
measures related to human capital 
development. Just as in West Ger-
many, this linkage was seldom 
achieved in the new federal states 
during the previous support period. 
According to the DIW, integrated sup-
port has so far been provided only in 
isolated cases, largely confined to 
structurally weak areas in Branden-
burg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommem and 
Saxony. Here, for example, training 
establishments were equipped with 
the assistance of ERDF funding, 
while the retraining measures subse-
quently implemented were supported 
by the ESF. In addition to the work 
overload of fund administrators, the 
lack of integrative policy approaches 
is put down to the largely uncoordi-
nated planning of support measures 
in the various administrative depart-
ments responsible. Last but not least, 
the close links between the ERDF and 
the GA have exacerbated the problem 
of ensuring the integrated deploy-
ment of resources from the structural 
funds. 
Principle of "social partnership" 
not adequately respected 
Due to the urgency of the problems 
and the difficulties associated in es-
tablishing administrative structures, 
virtually no attempt was made to in-
corporate local government and the 
social partners in drawing up the 
state-level support programmes (op-
erational programmes) in 1990/91. 
Thus a second basic principle of the 
reform of 1989 was not adequately 
respected. Experts are of the view 
that it is unlikely that in the future 
the relevant social actors will be ena-
bled to play a wider role in structural 
promotion, and, in particular, that 
this role will not extend significantly 
beyond federal state level. Although 
the institutional framework required 
for such cooperation does exist in East 
Germany - as revealed, for instance, 
by the efforts to maintain "industrial 
cores" and the associated initiatives of 
the "industry policy discussion and 
working circles" (cf. East Germany, 
No. 11, pp. 7-9)- the political require-
ments for greater decentralisation 
and for the participation of the rel-
evant social actors in structural pro-
motion work on the ground have not 
been met. 
The new support concept 1994· 
1999 
Because of the conflict over the link-
age between the ERDF and the GA, 
the Community Support Concept 
(CSC) for the support period 1994-
1999 was delayed and not finalised 
until July 1994. The esc is drawn up 
jointly by the Commission and the 
federal government. It sets the frame-
work for the deployment of structural 
support funds, the development objec-
tives and the focal points for support 
in the coming years. It is supple-
Table 2: The Activities of the European Structural Funds in East Germany 1994-1999: Planned Distribution of 
Resources and Cofinancing (million ECU) 
Priority support area Resources from the structural funds Co financing Total 
expenditure 
Total ERDF ESF EAGGF Loan National funding 
EIB/ECSCll 
public private 
1. Productive investment 2,430.6 2,375.2 55.4 2,439.9 12,689.7 17,560.2 
2. Small and medium-sized 
enterprises 2,317.9 2,064.7 253.0 1,990.8 13,073.4 17,382.1 
3. Research, development, 
innovation 613.1 485 128.1 433.7 1,045.0 2,091.8 
4. Environment 1,105.7 805.7 300.0 948.7 714.5 2,768.9 
5. Labour market policy 3,648.2 584.0 3,064.1 2,659.7 519.5 6,827.4 
6. Agriculture 3,224.3 425.3 107.3 2,691.72) 1,664.4 5,966.5 10,855.2 
7. Technical assistance 300.2 80.0 183.9 36.3 118.5 2.0 420.7 
Total 13,640.0 6,820.0 4,092.0 2,728.0 4,300-5,400 10,255.7 34,010.6 57,906.3 
1) EIB: European Investment Bank; ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community 
2) Including ECU 83.5 million from the fisheries fund 
Source: European Commission. 
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mented by specific, so-called "opera-
tional programmes" presented by the 
state authorities responsible. 
Instead of the previous eight prior-
ity areas for resource deployment, the 
new support concept contains six 
(Table 2): 
1. support for productive investment 
and complementary investment in 
infrastructure relevant to eco-
nomic activity; 
2. measures in support of small and 
medium-sized enterprises; 
3. measures in support of research, 
technological development and in-
novation; 
4. measures to protect and improve 
the environment; 
5. measures aimed at reducing unem-
ployment and promoting labour 
force potential, vocational further 
training and employment meas-
ures; 
6. measures in support of agriculture, 
rural development and fisheries. 
In addition to the six priority develop-
ment areas, "technical assistance" 
measures are to be provided at federal 
state level. Such assistance includes 
preliminary studies, guidance and 
evaluation of the support, the ex-
change of experience, publications 
and information on support from the 
structural funds. 
The principle of national co-
financing remains in place. Including 
this cofinancing, which is to come 
from both public and private sources, 
the ECU 14 billion from the structural 
funds are to generate total spending of 
almost ECU 58 billion ( cf. Table 2). As 
in the previous support phase the ESF 
is to support the labour market pro-
grammes implemented by the federal 
states and the measures implemented 
at national level by the Federal La-
bour Office. Within this framework 
the following measures which go be-
yond the instruments covered by the 
LPA are to receive support: 
- training opportunities not linked to 
a specific employer; 
- social guidance for participants in 
training measures; 
- support for the inclusion of foreign 
languages in vocational training 
measures; 
- German language courses for im-
migrant workers from non-EU 
countries and ethnic Germans from 
Eastern Europe; 
- practical training abroad as part of 
vocational training schemes; 
- training in social skills; 
- measures to improve placement 
prospects; 
- ESF maintenance allowance and 
child-care costs for participants in 
training schemes; 
- supplementary support for work 
familiarisation allowance and ben-
efits for those setting up their own 
business. 
In view of the lessons learnt during 
the previous support period, stricter 
regulations have been imposed for the 
new programme period, offering less 
scope for administrative decisions. 
For instance, it is now virtually im-
possible to carry over resources into 
the next financial year, a practice ini-
tially tolerated in view of the adminis-
trative difficulties in the start-up 
phase. Greater attention is being paid 
to a "concentrated deployment of re-
sources", and closer links with other 
EC support instruments (training 
programmes, community initiatives, 
etc.) are being sought. Finally, special 
emphasis is to be given to the preven-
tive aspect of training measures, par-
ticularly within ESF support. 
Newly introduced: the 
Community Initiatives 
In contrast to the first support period, 
the various "Community Initiatives" 
are now also starting to play their part 
in East Germany. Within the frame-
work of such initiatives - examples 
include the vocational training initia-
tive HORIZON, the NOW initiative, 
whose aim is to promote women, and 
branch-specific initiatives such as 
RETEX for the textile industry and 
RECHAR and RESIDER for coal and 
steel regions- community-level tasks 
are promoted and transnational 
measures involving other regions 
within the European Union are imple-
mented. During the first programme 
period no financial support for such 
initiatives in East Germany was 
made available, with the exception of 
the KONVER initiative, started in 
1993, and its predecessor PERIF A, in 
which the new federal states also par-
ticipated. The aim of KONVER is to 
mitigate the negative economic conse-
quences of military disarmament. In 
the new Liinder this enabled, among 
other things, environmental hazards 
on former military sites to be investi-
gated and removed. The resources 
made available through the Commu-
nity Initiatives account for around 9% 
East Germany no. 16/17 - November 1995 
INSTRUMENTS 
of the structural fund resources spent 
in East Germany, and do not supple-
ment such resources as was originally 
demanded by the new federal states. 
Expert opinion is ambivalent on the 
question of the opportunities provided 
by the resources from the Community 
Initiatives. In view of the decade-long 
geographical isolation of the former 
GDR, it is widely accepted that there 
is a great need for transnational 
measures with other regions of the 
Union in order to promote occupa-
tional, geographical and cultural mo-
bility with a view to developing the 
Single Market. On the other hand, 
each new support option requires na-
tional cofinancing, leads to additional 
coordination problems and adminis-
trative expenditure, and renders the 
already complex support system even 
more impenetrable ("support jungle"). 
In the light of this, the DIW, in its 
report to the Commission, pointed out 
the critical aspects associated with 
the new support opportunities pro-
vided by the Community Initiatives. 
It should be borne in mind, the Insti-
tute emphasised, that in many cases 
the objectives of the initiatives could 
be promoted within the framework of 
the normal structural fund pro-
grammes. 
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ESSAY II 
Transformation Shocks in Eastern Europe 
Unemployment in Europe is rising at an alarming rate. A plea for a realistic assessment. 
To outside observers at the time, reunification of Ger-many seemed to offer the prospect of a more rapid and 
less painful economic revival than for many other former 
centrally planned economies, simply because the capacity 
to subsidise the investment required and to assist those 
directly affected by the upheaval seemed so much greater 
than anywhere else, and because the legal, administrative 
and regulatory procedures were well established. But this 
image gradually gave way to the perception, among many 
observers, that rapid economic, social and political re-
structuring in the eastern part of Germany was creating a 
sharp "J-curve": only after a drastic fall in output, employ-
ment and income would there be a revival, during which 
privatisation and restructuring, cushioned by labour mar-
ket policies and hefty subsidies, would enable the phoenix 
to rise from the ashes of the former GDR. Yet even this is 
now widely considered overoptimistic. 
Whatever the eventual outcome, what has been hap-pening in the economy and in the labour market in 
the eastern part of Germany has vital relevance to the 
major countries of central and eastern Europe. Many eco-
nomists, politicians and others involved in the region have 
looked to Germany for models, lessons and harbingers of 
revival to encourage their own reform efforts. In particu-
lar, the privatisation experience has been followed keenly, 
and everywhere high hopes have been placed on labour 
market policies to overcome what Janos Kornai, one of the 
best-known east European economists, called- somewhat 
optimistically, as it has turned out- the "transition reces-
sion". But in late 1995 it is time to make a sobering 
assessment of what has been happening in the labour 
markets of all countries of the central and eastern Euro-
pean region. It is now appropriate to differentiate between 
the few countries of central Europe, such as the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, where economic dynamism is evi-
dent, and the countries of the former Soviet Union, where 
the economic slump continues to be awesome. Above all, 
this means taking stock of what has been taking place in 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine, which between 
them have over 200 million people, whose plight will affect 
the labour markets of most countries of Europe for many 
years to come. 
I t needs to be made very clear that the unemployment and labour market impoverishment in eastern Europe 
is much worse than anywhere else in Europe. Of course, 
the official east German unemployment rate of 15%, or 
thereabouts, is a terrible medium-term outcome of the so-
called "transition", especially bearing in mind the many 
not counted as unemployed, those on job creation 
schemes, training or in early retirement. But the situation 
in Russia and Ukraine is undoubtedly worse, and in Po-
land (the third largest country of the region, in terms of 
population) unemployment and poverty are at least as 
bad. Only in the Czech Republic can one say with confi-
dence that the labour market outcomes of reform have 
been tolerable. One uses the word "tolerable" advisedly, 
since some apologists for "shock therapy" have claimed 
that the situation in eastern Europe cannot be so bad 
because people have not been taking to the streets in large 
numbers in violent demonstrations. The reality is that the 
tragedy has been one of"implosion"; people have turned in 
on themselves, have fallen ill or died prematurely or have 
been struck by social ills such as alcoholism and mafia-
style crime. In the Russian Federation, life expectancy has 
fallen dramatically, with male life expectancy at birth 
falling by seven years within the space of just seven years, 
to about 58 years. In Ukraine, life expectancy has also 
been dropping, as it has in various other parts of the 
region. This clearly reflects the adjustment stress due in 
large part to labour market dislocations that have given 
little prospect of employment security. 
Labour surplus and unemployment in eastern and cen-tral Europe will continue to be chronically high for the 
remainder of the century. The gravity of the situation must 
be emphasised, calmly and realistically. For far too long, 
advocates of "shock therapy" have been claiming that the 
labour market situation in eastern Europe is not serious. 
Thus, economic advisers to Russian and Ukrainian govern-
ments have persistently claimed that unemployment in 
those two countries was about 1% or 2%, and that there was 
no rapid growth in unemployment taking place. This was 
nonsense when they claimed it, and is certainly nonsense in 
late 1995. Careful empirical assessments put the current 
figure at 13% and rising rapidly. 
The actual number out of work is a matter of judge-ment, in part because the major development over the 
past three or four years has been the growth of informal 
lay-offs, with hundreds of thousands of workers being put 
on "unpaid leave" or not being paid wages for many 
months at a time. Perhaps a third of all workers in Rus-
sian and Ukrainian enterprises have been in this state, 
and they are counted as employed, thus artificially deflat-
ing the unemployment rate doubly. The drag on restruc-
turing that such practices represent cannot be exagger-
ated. Some well-known labour economists have claimed 
that the responses of firms in those countries demonstrate 
a vibrant and flexible labour market. This too is a regret-
table interpretation. Labour market and employment re-
structuring require mobility and they require that what-
ever developments take place in firms have the effect of 
raising labour productivity in the short, medium and long 
term. Yet what has been happening is that the workers 
directly affected have been pushed into idleness, or into 
the informal and black economy in order to survive, while 
they have been impoverished by a lack of entitlement to 
labour market benefits. Workers hit by the fall in produc-
tion, incomes and employment have not been protected 
through state benefits, and one of the reasons for that is 
that the gravity of the situation has not been recognised, 
or indeed has been concealed, particularly by economic 
advisers. This has meant that labour market policies to 
respond to high unemployment and severe employment 
dislocation have been underdeveloped and given inad-
equate resources. 
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H ere, the lessons from Germany are important. First, labour market statistics have revealed the major 
trends more clearly than in many other countries. Second, 
considerable attention has been given to labour market 
measures to help ameliorate the mass unemployment, 
and income-support and job creation schemes have held 
down the level and growth of unemployment. Yet still the 
unemployment and job losses have been massive. If coun-
tries such as Bulgaria, with about 20% unemployment, 
and Russia and Ukraine with worse underlying labour 
market problems are to move in the direction of Germany, 
the prospects for unemployment are grim. It will require a 
massive ~obilisation of resources, and a coordinated ap-
proach from the international community. At present, the 
resource transfer is too small, the technical assistance is 
very uncoordinated and the process suffers from almost 
comical duplication of effort, advice and resource trans-
fers. 
C onsider some areas where reform is most urgently required. Among the ironies of the unfortunate di-
chotomy of"active" and "passive" labour market policies is 
that governments have been encouraged to cut back on 
measures that they have been induced to call "passive", 
which has meant, most of all, unemployment insurance 
benefits. In every country of the region, initially fairly 
generous unemployment benefits have been curtailed, with 
levels ofbenefit being cut in real terms and with conditions 
for entitlement being made much tighter. A dire conse-
quence has been that a dwindling proportion of the unem-
ployed have been receiving benefits, the remainder having 
been pushed onto social assistance, to the extent that it 
exists. And the benefits have been minimal in almost all the 
countries. Less than 20% of the unemployed in eastern 
European countries such as Russia and Ukraine receive 
unemployment benefits, and the amount received by those 
few who receive them is typically well below the amount 
needed for a minimal subsistence. 
H owever, a further irony is that while governments have been urged to shift from "passive" to "active" 
policies and have been trying to do so, the rise in unemploy-
ment and the need for welfare transfers have made it hard 
for them to shift in that direction. This has led some of them 
to cut benefits even more, resulting in more intense poverty 
and sharply growing income inequality. 
What of a terrible legacy of the labour markets of the old system, the lack of modern skills? There has been 
much interest in encouraging adoption of German training 
systems in countries of central and eastern Europe. How-
ever, the reality is that throughout the region old training 
systems have collapsed much faster than new systems have 
grown. There are essentially four forms of training and skill 
formation- vocational education, apprenticeship training, 
enterprise-based job training and labour market training. 
The first refers to training in colleges and universities by 
those outside the labour force. There has been a dramatic 
decline in numbers of students enrolled in such institutions 
in Russia and Ukraine and some other countries. Appren-
ticeship training has not really spread, and the type of jobs 
that have been emerging have not made this likely. Enter-
prise-based job training has been decimated, as our factory 
surveys in llulgaria, Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere have 
documentedr So, great hopes have been placed - or much 
emphasis h~s been placed-on labour market training, that 
is, training provided to the unemployed. 
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I t is time for realism here, too. The lessons from Germany and from western Europe generally are that such train-
ing must be carefully targeted on creating skills in short 
supply and that they must be monitored. Too often, the 
content of the schemes is of dubious quality, and there are 
surely substantial deadweight and substitution effects that 
make the economic cost of such schemes much greater than 
commonly believed, and the value in assisting in labour 
market restructuring much less. In the absence of proper 
evaluation, considerable sums of money are likely to be 
spent on providing "training" that scarcely improves the 
skills of participants, while many of those "trained" will 
merely displace other workers who were doing jobs as well 
or almost as well. The same shortcomings characterise so-
called public works, popular responses to unemployment 
but which require all sorts of unlikely institutional safe-
guards and conditions if they are to make any substantial 
dent in unemployment. 
Turning from labour market policies to institutional developments in labour markets, a feature across the 
region has been de-unionisation. This has enormous rami-
fications. We know that under the old system, the trade 
union was a "conveyor belt" for the Party and was mainly an 
intermediary of management focusing on the provision of 
social benefits through the enterprise. Since the late 1980s, 
those roles have been whittled away and unions have found 
it hard to secure a sense of legitimacy. Real membership 
levels have shrunk in all countries, while bargaining over 
wages and benefits, as well as over working conditions and 
much else, has been decentralised, if not removed alto-
gether. 
A second feature impinging on labour market trends is that public administration reform has been neglected, 
in part because of the "state desertion" underlying the 
shock therapy approach to economic policy. To achieve 
economic restructuring requires a strong, legitimated state 
apparatus, yet in many places cutbacks in public expendi-
ture have left salaries and working conditions in the public 
sector so bad that they have almost guaranteed opportun-
ism and corruption and meant that the public sector has 
failed to attract or retain good employees. This has eroded 
the capacity to implement and refine labour market and 
other policies. 
This and de-unionisation have contributed to the longer-term process by which labour regulations have become 
loose guidelines rather than rigid constraints on enterprise 
behaviour. Having visited dozens and dozens of enterprises 
in our surveys over the past five years, one feels confident 
in concluding that far too much attention is paid to the 
alleged impact oflabour regulations, particularly by those 
who wish to attribute the growth or persistence of unem-
ployment to such regulations. In the labour markets of 
eastern Europe, employers can and do bypass regulations 
with impunity. 
The insecurities and inequalities that characterise the labour markets of the region should not be allowed to 
continue for very long, for societies in which large minori-
ties are condemned to live in penury and insecurity are 
scarcely what democratic reformers should have in mind. 
The word that comes extraordinarily often into conversa-
tions about labour market developments in eastern Eu-
rope is "mafia"- a term covering a very wide spectrum of 
criminal, illegal and unregulated activities, raging from 
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violent gangster capitalism to the opportunistic survival 
activities of impoverished bureaucrats to the pitiful street-
side pursuits of the hungry and impoverished. 
The policy response to this, and to the chronic unem-ployment that fuels its growth, is likely to be more 
heavy-handed policing of civil society, unless proper in-
come support schemes can be developed and institutional 
mechanisms can be encouraged that will provide new, 
more democratic modes of governance. In this regard, new 
forms of "tripartism" will have to emerge, in which repre-
sentative bodies voice the interests of those in employ-
ment, those on the margins of the labour market and those 
moving in and out of it. New forms of industrial and 
economic democracy will have to emerge alongside new 
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labour market institutions so as to allow the Voice of those 
affected by restructuring to help shape the policies for 
ensuring that, in the necessary drive to improve produc-
tivity and efficiency, distributive justice is never over-
looked. 
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